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CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE TRADING
SYSTEM: AFTER DOHA AND DOHA
Dan Ciuriak and Natassia Ciuriak†
SUMMARY
The international trade dispute over Ontario’s “green energy” policies is a harbinger of similar problems
to come; an early example of the emerging conflict between industry rules aimed at reducing
greenhouse gas emissions, and existing trade deals between national governments. We live in a world
without formalized and sweeping multilateral climate change treaties between major economies, but
one with many sweeping trade treaties between them. That discrepancy is setting up the conditions for
more trade disputes in the future.
Governments have every incentive to position climate change policies, as Ontario has, as support for
new growth industries and the creation of local “green jobs.” But they also have every incentive to want
to prevent the leakage of those envisioned economic benefits to outside parties, at the very least when
those outside parties come from places that do not share the burden of climate change mitigation. The
current trade-law framework has lent itself to the interpretation, by arbitration panels, that “free riders”
— that is, industries and countries that bear little to no responsibility for shouldering the costs of climate
change policies — are nevertheless entitled to share in the commercial benefits that may be created by
climate policies in jurisdictions that do make efforts to reduce carbon emissions. In short, if a
corporation or state-owned enterprise from a country lacking climate change policies wants to take
advantage of the economic benefits of Ontario’s feed-in-tariff program, it would seem there is little
Ontario can do to stop it, without running afoul of trade agreements. 
The result is a worst-case scenario. The problem of climate change continues to worsen, while
governments — national and sub-national — face disincentives for implementing regulations and
subsidies that might help mitigate the problem. This is because they cannot be sure that they will not
be left to shoulder the cost while foreign actors, without similar environmental commitments, take
advantage of the attendant economic benefits. There is also the real possibility that some governments
may disguise anti-trade motives by cloaking them under the cover of environmental policy.
These conflicts need not happen and, if we are committed to slowing climate change, it cannot be
allowed to happen. The global trading community must find ways to exempt domestic climate change
policies from traditional tariff and trade commitments, while also guarding against the potential abuse
of that exemption. One possibility is exempting from tariff restrictions “border carbon adjustments”
(BCAs), which apply varying tariffs to goods moving across borders based on the carbon emitted across
the supply chain. The corporate sector’s increasing sophistication in quantifying supply-chain
emissions, as part of corporate competitive efforts, makes BCAs more feasible for governments to
implement. And there is already some evidence to suggest that BCAs can be accommodated within the
current WTO rules, although some bending of the rules may be required. Still, the climate change threat
is grave and urgent. If ever there was a reason to bend global trade rules, accommodating earnest
climate-change-mitigation efforts is arguably the best one yet.
† This paper has benefited greatly from the comments and suggestions of three anonymous
referees. Any remaining errors of fact or interpretation are the sole responsibility of the authors.
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LES CHANGEMENTS CLIMATIQUES ET
LE SYSTÈME COMMERCIAL : APRÈS
DOHA ET DOHA   
Dan Ciuriak et Natassia Ciuriak 
RÉSUMÉ
Le différend commercial international sur les politiques « d’énergie verte » de l’Ontario représente un avant-goût des
problèmes qui nous attendent; il constitue un tout premier exemple de la faille qui se creuse entre les règles de
l’industrie qui visent à réduire les gaz à effet de serre et les accords commerciaux actuels entre gouvernements
nationaux. Nous vivons dans un monde où il n’existe pas de traité d’envergure en bonne et due forme sur les
changements climatiques entre les principales économies, mais où les traités commerciaux généralisés abondent.
Ce déséquilibre crée les conditions susceptibles d’engendrer davantage de conflits commerciaux dans l’avenir. 
Les gouvernements ont toutes les raisons de faire comme l’Ontario et de tabler sur des politiques ayant trait aux
changements climatiques de manière à soutenir de nouveaux secteurs de croissance et la création d’« emplois verts »
locaux. Mais ils ont aussi toutes les raisons de vouloir empêcher que les avantages économiques ainsi prévus ne
leur échappent au profit d’autres parties, surtout quand celles-ci sont issues de pays qui ne partagent pas le fardeau
de l’atténuation des changements climatiques. Dans le cadre juridique commercial actuel fondé sur les tribunaux
d’arbitrage, on a fini par interpréter que les « bénéficiaires sans contrepartie » – c’est-à-dire les industries et les pays
qui n’assument aucune responsabilité financière, ou si peu, en ce qui a trait au coût des politiques sur les
changements climatiques – peuvent malgré tout prendre part aux avantages commerciaux découlant des politiques
sur le climat mises en place par des gouvernements déterminés à réduire leurs émissions de carbone. En somme, si
une entreprise ou une société d’État d’un pays où les politiques sur les changements climatiques sont inexistantes
veut tirer profit des avantages économiques du Programme de tarifs de rachat de l’Ontario, il semble que la province
ne puisse pas faire grand-chose pour l’en empêcher sans enfreindre les accords commerciaux.
Le résultat ne pourrait pas être pire. Le problème des changements climatiques continue de s’aggraver tandis que
les gouvernements – nationaux et régionaux – sont confrontés à des situations qui les dissuadent de mettre en
oeuvre une réglementation et des subventions destinées à réduire le problème, parce que rien ne leur garantit
qu’ils ne devront pas en éponger seul les coûts tandis qu’à l’étranger, les acteurs qui n’ont pas pris d’engagements
similaires profitent des avantages économiques qui en découlent. Il existe aussi une possibilité très réelle que
certains gouvernements camouflent des motivations défavorable au commerce sous le couvert d’une politique de
protection de l’environnement.
Ces différends ne sont pas inéluctables, et nous devons à tout prix les éviter si nous sommes déterminés à ralentir
les changements climatiques. Les partenaires du commerce international doivent trouver des moyens d’exempter
les politiques nationales sur les changements climatiques des engagements tarifaires et commerciaux traditionnels
et se prémunir contre les abus potentiels liés à cette exemption. Une solution consisterait à exempter des
restrictions tarifaires les « ajustements à la frontière pour le carbone », qui appliquent des tarifs variables aux
marchandises traversant les frontières, en fonction du carbone émis tout au long de la chaîne
d’approvisionnement. La mise en place par le secteur des entreprises d’un processus de plus en plus précis et
détaillé de quantification des émissions de carbone dans la chaîne logistique, processus adopté pour soutenir la
concurrence, a pour effet que les gouvernements peuvent plus facilement appliquer ces ajustements. Et tout
semble d’ores et déjà indiquer qu’il est possible d’y parvenir dans le cadre des règles actuelles de l’OMC, même s’il
faut pour cela contourner quelque peu ces règles. Il n’en reste pas moins que la menace des changements
climatiques est grave et qu’elle exige des mesures urgentes. S’il existe un motif valable de contourner les règles
internationales du commerce, c’est sans contredit celui de faciliter en toute bonne foi les efforts d’atténuation des
changements climatiques.
INTRODUCTION
The potential for conflict between trade rules and climate change mitigation policies has long
been recognized. The interactions between trade rules and climate change policy were explored
in great depth following the Stern Report in 2006.1 The discussion peaked just as the economic
boom of the 2000s was coming to a crashing halt in the global financial crisis of 2008-2009.
The OECD dedicated its 2009 Global Forum on Trade to trade and climate change issues, and
the UN Environmental Program (UNEP) and the WTO issued a major joint report on the
intersection between trade rules and climate change policy, also in 2009.2 The think tank
community, which tends to gravitate towards topical issues, also generated a raft of studies and
commentaries.3 Since then, trade and climate change issues have been largely off the political
radar screen and confined to the respective professional communities as policymakers turned
their attention to grapple with the massive fiscal problems generated by the economic and
financial crisis.4
In the meantime, the multilateral process on climate change has sputtered, with a series of
Conferences of the Parties (COPs) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change (UNFCCC), including the 18th COP held at Doha in December 2012, failing to deliver
a binding successor to the Kyoto Protocol. At the same time, the failure of the Doha Round of
trade negotiations has stranded the talks to find a multilaterally agreed trade accommodation of
climate change mitigation policies. After Doha and Doha, trade and climate change policies are
colliding without agreed rules to sort out the problems inherent in their intersection. 
The scale of the underlying problem has not diminished with the passage of time. Scenarios
involving 5°C or more of global warming are now being considered by major international
organizations.5 Meanwhile, a recent report published by the World Bank details why a 4°C
warmer world must be avoided (implicitly at all costs), observing that “a global mean
temperature increase of 4°C approaches the difference between temperatures today and those of
the last ice age.”6 It is not likely to be a small deal.
1 For example, Pascal Lamy’s attendance at the 24th Session of UNEP's Governing Council/Global Ministerial
Environment Forum in Nairobi, Feb. 5–9, 2007, was the first such participation by a WTO director-general in a UNEP
Governing Council meeting. See WTO, “Existing Forms of Cooperation and Information Exchange between
UNEP/MEAs and the WTO,” TN/TE/S/2/Rev.2, January 16, 2007.
2 UNEP and WTO, Trade and Climate Change (Switzerland: WTO Secretariat, 2009).
3 See, for example: Joost Pauwelyn, U.S. Federal Climate Policy and Competitiveness Concerns: The Limits and
Options of International Trade Law (Durham, N.C.: Duke University, 2007); Dan Ciuriak and Bob Johnstone,
“Climate Change and the Trading System,” Conference Report, Centre for International Governance Innovation, 2009;
Michael Grubb et al., “Climate Policy and Industrial Competitiveness: Ten Insights from Europe on the EU Emissions
Trading System,” The German Marshall Fund, Climate & Energy Paper Series 9 (2009); and Gary Clyde Hufbauer
and Jisun Kim, “The World Trade Organization and Climate Change: Challenges and Options,” Peterson Institute for
International Economics, Working Paper Series 9 (2009).
4 A similar surge of interest in sustainability in the context of a boom occurred in APEC circles during the “Asian
Miracle” years. At Osaka in 1995, APEC economic leaders agreed on the need to address the impact of population and
economic growth on demand for food and energy and pressures on the environment (the “FEEEP” initiative). This led
to a FEEEP Symposium in 1997 just as the Asian Crisis was getting underway. Political attention in the Asia-Pacific
region immediately switched from environmental sustainability to restoring growth. See Dan Ciuriak, “The Impact of
Expanding Population and Economic Growth on Food, Energy and the Environment (FEEEP): A Progress Report”
(paper presented at the conference “Agriculture and Sustainable Development: China and Its Trading Partners,” Texas
A&M University, January14–16, 1998).
5 See Fred Harvey, “Waiting on new climate deal 'will set world on a path to 5C warming,’” The Guardian, June 10, 2013.
6 Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research and Climate Analytics, Turn Down The Heat: Why a 4°C Warmer
World Must Be Avoided (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 2012), xiv.
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In the absence of a multilateral consensus on climate change, unilateral measures are being
implemented, including in systemically important economies, with varying levels of ambition
and conditions, and taking shape in differing technical forms. Disciplines being imposed on
business differ in terms of the costs imposed, and subsidies for renewable-energy development
are being made both for industrial-policy reasons and to meet sustainability objectives. There is
also widespread bottom-up activism: at the municipal and sub-national state/provincial levels;
at the corporate level, driven by activist boards and “green” consumers, as well as supply-chain
security concerns; and at the private level, where litigation is being used to prompt action. 
However, these efforts are falling well short of what is needed to contain emissions to the
agreed acceptable level. In part, this is due to the counter-productive effect of fossil-fuel
subsidization: the International Energy Agency (IEA) estimates that subsidies for fossil fuels
globally, driven by rising energy prices, rose by 27.6 per cent from US$412 billion in 2010 to
US$523 billion in 2011, dwarfing the $88 billion in subsidies for the emerging renewable-
energy industry.7 The IMF, taking into account the failure of taxes to reflect negative
externalities,8 puts the effective support level in 2011 at roughly US$1.9 trillion, equivalent to
2.5 per cent of global GDP or 8 per cent of total government revenues, with 40 per cent of this
subsidy provided by the advanced countries.
There is also evidence that trade and trade rules are also working in a counter-productive
fashion. Three negative dynamics have emerged endogenously in the interaction between
climate change abatement and the trading system. First, trade linkages are undermining
effective unilateral action due to industrial competitiveness concerns. Second, activist
governments seeking to capture the economic benefits of publicly-funded abatement measures
are coming into conflict with trade rules as they seek to prevent leakage through trade. Third,
while funding of climate change measures is public, delivery of solutions is private. Given the
essential role of emerging industries in climate change abatement, industrial policy
competition, including through strategic trade policy, has been induced with the resulting
rivalries spilling over, not surprisingly, into the trade-dispute settlement system. 
7 See, IEA, World Energy Outlook 2012: Executive Summary (Paris: International Energy Agency, 2012) 1. The OECD
Inventory of estimated budgetary support and tax expenditures for fossil-fuel production and consumption in 34
OECD countries identified some 550 individual mechanisms that provided support valued at between US$55 billion
and US$90 billion a year during 2005–2011. The OECD report warns that caution is required in interpreting the
support amounts, including because not all these mechanisms are clearly inefficient; nonetheless, it concludes that
there is ample scope for both saving money and improving the environment through fossil-fuel subsidy reform in the
advanced countries as well as in developing countries and the emerging markets. See OECD, “Inventory of
Estimated Budgetary Support and Tax Expenditures for Fossil Fuels 2013” (Paris: OECD, 2013), 3.
8 This figure includes a Pigouvian tax set equal to the estimated negative externalities of fossil-fuel use of US$25 per
ton of CO2 emissions, following the U.S. Interagency Working Group on Social Cost of Carbon, “Technical Support
Document: Social Cost of Carbon for Regulatory Impact Analysis Under Executive Order 12866,” February 2010.
The latter group issued an update in May 2013 that raises the social cost by between 55 per cent and 71 per cent. See
Interagency Working Group on Social Cost of Carbon, “Technical Support Document: - Technical Update of the
Social Cost of Carbon for Regulatory Impact Analysis — Under Executive Order 12866,” May 2013. Taking this into
account, the IMF figure would rise to about US$2.75 trillion. See IMF, “Energy Subsidy Reform: Lessons and
Implications,” International Monetary Fund, January 28, 2013.
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3This paper surveys developments bearing on the intersection between the trading system and
climate change policies in a post-Doha context. The next section briefly summarizes the
progress in the multilateral process on climate change, the unresolved issues and stumbling
blocks to concerted action, and the current understanding of climate change trends and risks.
This is followed by a horizontal scan regarding the various responses that are being taken at
various levels in the absence of effective multilateral response and that are shaping the
commercial context for trade. Against this background, a section is devoted to developments at
the intersection between climate change policy and the trading system, and documents the
conflicts that have emerged. The paper concludes with discussion and consideration of the
scope for changing the dynamic such that, as was proved possible in other important
environmental policy areas, trade serves to strengthen climate change mitigation and the
trading system is not itself damaged in the process.
CLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION: THE MULTILATERAL PROCESS
Progress of the COP Process 
The multilateral process on climate change has been marked by slow progress and much
friction in the attempt to negotiate a successor to the Kyoto Protocol. The 18th session of the
Conference of the Parties (COP 18) was no exception. The world attempted to find “balance
and ambition” and ended with neither. 
The present cycle of climate change negotiations was launched in Bali, Indonesia, at COP 13 in
December 2007. The “Bali Action Plan” that emerged set out the framework for negotiating a
successor to the Kyoto Protocol. 
COP 14 in Poznan, Poland in December 2008 launched an adaptation fund, but otherwise cited
as its main achievement an “intensified negotiating schedule for 2009”.9
COP 15 in Copenhagen, Denmark, which took place at the height of political attention to
climate change in December 2009, was supposed to “seal the deal” with a successor agreement
to the Kyoto Protocol, with concrete economic incentives, technology-transfer mechanisms,
and appropriate climate-financing procedures, as well as an agreement to strengthen and
broaden the multilateral carbon-trading system.10 Unfortunately, the non-binding Copenhagen
Accord provided only pledges of emission reductions and climate financing for the developing
world. The parties essentially once again agreed to put off negotiating binding targets until
COP 16 in Cancún, Mexico at the end of 2010.
9 UNFCCC, “Poznań Climate Change Conference – December 2008,” United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change, http://unfccc.int/meetings/poznan_dec_2008/meeting/6314.php.
10 ICTSD, “Climate Change and Trade on the Road to Copenhagen: A Policy Discussion Paper,” ICTSD, December
2008, http://ictsd.org/i/publications/40603/.
COP 16 was more successful, as parties agreed to anchor mitigation pledges and took steps
toward strengthening climate financing through the newly created Green Climate Fund.
Progress was also made toward creating a verification system to increase the transparency of
climate-action reporting. However, COP 16 also ended amid much uncertainty regarding
whether or not these transparency and funding institutions would go beyond talk and promises
to generate actual, concrete mechanisms. Additionally, Kyoto’s binding successor remained
elusive.
In 2011, COP 17 in Durban, South Africa made some headway in answering these questions.
Another phase of the Kyoto Protocol was initiated when the parties adopted a group of
decisions. A successor agreement was to start in 2020 and was to be negotiated in a newly-
launched series of talks with the issue of differentiated responsibilities between developed and
developing economies left open. Steps were taken to formally establish the Green Climate
Fund (though the “how” and “when” were left to be determined in Doha in 2012) and to
implement stronger reporting requirements.11 Interim climate change negotiations held in Bonn,
Germany, from May 14-25, 2012, en route to Doha, broke down over disagreements on the
financing of the Green Climate Fund for developing nations and on burden-sharing between
developed and developing countries regarding greenhouse gas emission reductions.
In Doha, Qatar, COP 18 extended the Kyoto Protocol through to 2020, when a new global
climate deal, which is to be concluded by 2015, is to come into force; however, legally binding
commitments in this regard still only cover 37 countries, including the EU and Australia, which
collectively account for less than 15 per cent of emissions.12 Moreover, the biggest carbon
emitters — the United States, China, and India — remain without legally-binding
commitments. And those parties that did agree to extend the Protocol — most notably the EU
— did not deepen their emission-reduction commitments, only promising to consider this in
further negotiations. Perhaps the most important outcome from Doha was that the technical
apparatus for a global approach to climate change mitigation was preserved.13 The summit also
established a loss-and-damage mechanism that acknowledges that rich nations should move
towards compensating poor nations for losses due to climate change — although this
agreement was only possible by positioning the loss-and-damage mechanism under the existing
pledge to mobilize US$100 billion a year for poor nations to adapt to climate change.14
11 Center for Climate and Energy Solutions, “Outcomes of the U.N. Climate Change Conference in Durban, South
Africa,” C2ES, 2011.
12 Roger Harrabin, “UN climate talks extend Kyoto Protocol, promise compensation,” BBC News,
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/science-environment-20653018, December 8, 2012.
13 UNEP, “Doha Climate Conference Opens Gateway to Greater Ambition and Action on Climate Change,” UNEP
News Centre, http://www.unep.org/newscentre/default.aspx?DocumentID=2700 &ArticleID=9353, December 9,
2012.
14 See note 12 above.
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Issues and Stumbling Blocks 
There is a broad consensus regarding the need to limit global temperature rise to no more than
2°C above pre-industrial levels.15 The 2°C scenario (which is considered far from a safe level,
as it involves considerable risks of triggering major climate-changing events)16 is based on
stabilizing atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide (CO2) at around 450 parts per million
(ppm). However, emissions have continued more or less unabated (save for the recession-
induced decline in 2009) and the 400-ppm mark was reached on a weekly average basis in
May 2013.17 The feasibility of keeping within the 450-ppm threshold is diminishing rapidly
and the commitments on the table in the COP process will not come close to achieving this
result. 
How seriously the commitments are being taken is also at issue. A recent assessment suggests
that the likelihood that individual countries will meet their existing pledges varies. The EU is
judged as likely to meet its unconditional commitment, which is stronger than the commitment
made by the United States, which is judged as unlikely to be met. China’s commitment, on the
other hand, is judged as likely to be met.18 These assessments must be viewed against the
background of historical results, which showed that industrialized countries that ratified the
Kyoto Protocol together with the United States, which did not ratify, collectively reduced their
emissions in 2010 by approximately 7.5 per cent compared to 1990, and remained on target to
meet the original Kyoto Protocol objective of a 5.2-per-cent reduction. However, while
emissions from the EU and Russia decreased and Japan’s stabilized, U.S. emissions
increased.19 To be sure, the combination of a steep recession and the sharp expansion of U.S.  
15 Under pressure from island states, among others, governments have agreed to launch a review in 2013 to consider
strengthening the long-term goal to 1.5°C, which remains technically feasible. See Marion Vieweg et al., “2° be or
not 2° be,” Climate Action Tracker Update, Climate Analytics, PIK, and Ecofys, November 30, 2012,
http://www.climateanalytics.org/news/climate-action-tracker-update-2%C2%B0-be-or-not-2%C2%B0-be. This makes
the margin by which targets will fail to be met all the more significant if there is no strengthening of political will.
Even the G8 goals of reducing global emissions to 50 per cent below 2005 levels by 2050 to limit global warming in
2100 to 2°C (under certain assumptions) would still fall short of stabilizing temperatures. As the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency notes, “…while the G8 international goals stabilize global GHG emissions at 50% below 2005
levels, CO2 concentrations and temperature are not stabilized … Equilibrium temperature would only be achieved
after CO2 concentrations are in equilibrium. Second, the inertia in ocean temperatures causes the equilibrium global
mean surface temperature change to lag behind the observed global mean surface temperature change by as much as
500 years. Even if CO2 concentrations in 2100 were stabilized, observed temperatures would continue to rise for
centuries before the equilibrium were reached.” See: U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Atmospheric
Programs, Economic Impacts of S. 1733: The Clean Energy Jobs and American Power Act of 2009, GPO, 2009: 28.
16 IPCC, Working Group II, Contribution of Working Group II to the Fourth Assessment Report of the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2007, Section 19.4.2.2, “Scenario analysis and analysis of stabilisation
targets” (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).
17 The 400-ppm mark was breached on a daily reading in the week starting May 26, 2013 at Mauna Loa; the daily
average for that week is given as 400 ppm and the average for the month as a whole was just under 400 ppm. See
NOAA, “CO2 Weekly MLO,” NOAA, ftp://ftp.cmdl.noaa.gov/ccg/co2/trends/co2_weekly_mlo.txt. The annual
average for 2013 will remain below 400 ppm at about 396.6 ppm and the annualized trend will only breach the 400
mark in early 2015.
18 Vieweg et al., “2° be or not 2° be.”
19 Jos G.J. Olivier et al., “Long-term trend in global CO2 emissions: 2011 report,” PBL Netherlands Environmental
Assessment Agency, 2011.
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natural gas production through the hydraulic-fracturing revolution helped bring U.S. total GHG
emissions in 2011 back down to the lowest level since 1995.20 However, this is more a matter
of serendipity than a reflection of policy resolve.
Moreover, agriculture remains off the formal agenda. The agricultural sector is a major source
of greenhouses gases (GHGs), such as nitrous oxide and methane, which comprise 13.5 per
cent of all emissions, but are comparatively potent in terms of global warming potential.
However, developing countries have lobbied to deal with agriculture under “adaptation” rather
than “mitigation” due to the problems this would otherwise create for agricultural societies.
Agriculture remained off the agenda at Doha, being addressed in a subsidiary body.21
Additional tensions in the multilateral process have arisen regarding the allocation of resources
between mitigation and adaptation. The Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) is clearly in
favour of strong mitigation measures, since adaptation will do little to prevent its member
countries from being in part or wholly submerged below rising seas. Africa also has a low
capacity to adapt. Similarly, those concerned about the impact of increased emissions on the
oceans through lowered pH balances (“ocean acidification”) and the combination of rising sea
levels and acidification on coral reefs and the marine ecology generally favour emphasis on
mitigation.22 Other countries or interest groups are more interested in adaptation measures. 
Financial support to help developing countries adapt to and mitigate climate change faces
particular difficulties given the fiscal problems in the advanced countries. The Green Climate
Fund (GCF) has been added to the existing multilateral instruments that include the Global
Environment Facility, the Climate Investment Funds, and the Adaptation Fund. The bid to host
the GCF was won by South Korea; an interim secretariat was subsequently established in
Bonn, Germany (to be relocated to Songdo, South Korea by year-end 2013), an executive
director appointed (Hela Cheikhrouhou, a Tunisian national, formerly with the African
Development Bank), and the future business model discussed in detail if not yet hammered
out.23 The Fund is on track to become operational in 2014; the question of how developed 
20 See U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, “Inventory of U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Sinks: 1990 – 2011,”
April 12, 2013. Based on the steep decline in CO2 emissions from energy use in the first quarter of 2012, the total
GHG inventory in 2012 should fall still further. The U.S. Energy Information Administration (“U.S. energy-related
CO2 emissions in early 2012 lowest since 1992,” http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=7350, August 1,
2012) reports that CO2 emissions resulting from energy use during the first quarter of 2012 were the lowest in two
decades for any January–March period, the peak quarter for emissions, due to a mild winter that reduced household
heating demand and therefore energy use; a decline in coal-fired electricity generation, due largely to historically low
natural gas prices; and reduced gasoline demand. One unresolved concern related to the expansion of natural gas
from hydraulic fracturing processes is the leakage of “fugitive” methane. The review of studies conducted by
Bradbury et al. puts the global warming potential of methane at between 33 times and 105 times that of CO2 over a
20-year time frame, making it particularly important from a short-term mitigation perspective. See James Bradbury et
al., “Clearing the Air: Reducing Upstream Greenhouse Gas Emissions from U.S. Natural Gas Systems,” World
Resources Institute Working Paper, April 2013, Box 1. The commonly cited 25 x figure is over a 100-year time
frame. The U.S. EPA uses a 21 x figure for its inventory calculation. The U.S. pivot to gas has also been
accompanied by an expansion of U.S. coal exports, leaving open the question of the net impact on global GHG
emissions.
21 Agriculture is being discussed at the UNFCCC’s Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA).
22 See, for example, Natassia Ciuriak, “The Quiet Tsunami: The Ecological, Economic, Social, and Political
Consequences of Ocean Acidification,” Paterson Review of International Affairs 12 (2012): 123–143, for a
discussion on ocean acidification and its effects on tourism.
23 See Liane Schalatek, “Difficult Decisions – Deferred?” Heinrich Böll Stiftung, August 2013, for a report on the
fund’s board-level discussions concerning the business model for the fund, including the integration of a private-
sector role and the balancing of the pressures to “get on with it” and to “get it right.”
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countries will fund their long-term commitment to US$100 billion a year in climate financing,
however, remains undecided and is to be taken up at the 2013 COP in Warsaw, Poland. The
reported results on “fast start” funding for the 2010-2012 period do not inspire confidence
regarding the chances for success.24
An alternative to using fossil-fuel production for development was proposed by Ecuador,
which has an estimated 846 million barrels of oil buried under one of the most biologically rich
rainforests in the world, the Yasuní national park. Ecuador suggested that the international
community compensate it with half of the reserves’ value in exchange for leaving its oil in the
ground. As of November 2012, $300 million had been promised to this cause, coming from
European countries (including Germany, Belgium, and France), Latin American states
(including Chile, Colombia, and Brazil), and international corporations, such as Coca-Cola,
various airlines, and banks, as well as Brazilian, U.S., and Russian foundations.25 However,
despite the pledges, only $13 million had actually been donated and this was not nearly close
enough to the $3.6 billion required to provide sufficient incentive to Ecuador to keep it from
exploiting its oil reserves for this purpose.
Finally, a major stumbling block towards rapid decarbonization that should not be overlooked
is the reflection of proven reserves of oil and gas in company stock values. Present market
capitalization of the oil and gas sector is on the order of US$3 trillion.26 There is built-in
market pressure for these reserves to be pumped out and burned. HSBC recently estimated that
the value at risk from unburnable reserves would be equivalent to 40 to 60 per cent of the
market capitalization of the six major affected companies.27 The same point applies to oil and
gas reserves in developing countries. For these economies, the revenues are vital for
development purposes (for example, Ghana, which joined the oil producing states in 2010, 
24 In 2009, developed countries pledged US$30 billion in new and additional “fast start” financing to the GCF.
However, the International Institute for Environment and Development has found that only US$23.6 billion has so
far actually been committed and less than half of that sum is in grant form (the rest are being given as loans that must
be repaid at varying interest rates of interest attached). See David Ciplet et al., “The eight unmet promises of fast-
start climate finance,” IIED Briefing, International Institute for Environment and Development, 2012,
http://pubs.iied.org/17141IIED.html?c=climate. The lack of full transparency makes it difficult to verify that the
funds are new, as opposed to coming out of existing aid budgets; Oxfam estimates that only about 33 per cent are
new funds (Oxfam International, “The climate ‘fiscal cliff’: An evaluation of Fast Start Finance and lessons for the
future,” November 25, 2012, http://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/oxfam-media-advisory-climate-fiscal-
cliff-doha-25nov2012.pdf).
25 John Vidal, “Project to leave oil in ground under Yasuní park reaches $300m,” The Guardian, November 23, 2012,
http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2012/nov/23/yasuni-oil-ground-project.
26 The top 33 integrated international and national oil companies (IOCs/NOCs) and exploration and production (E&P)
companies alone had a market capitalization at the end of 2012 of US$2.9 trillion. See: PFC Energy 50, “The
Definitive Annual Ranking of the World’s Largest Listed Energy Firms,” PFC Energy 50, January 2013. At the end
of 2010, the majors had a market capitalization of US$1.2 trillion and a sample of 70 independents had an additional
US$0.4 trillion in market cap. See Mark J. Kaiser and Yunke Yu, “Part 1: Oil and gas company valuation, reserves,
and production,” Oil And Gas Financial Journal (February 1, 2012) http://www.ogfj.com/articles/print/volume-
9/issue-2/features/part-1-oil-and-gas-company.html.
27 HSBC, “Oil & carbon revisited: Value at risk from ‘unburnable’ reserves,” HSBC Global Research, January 25,
2013. Note that the main impact of factoring in the “unburnable” share of reserves would fall on coal, followed by
oil and to a lesser extent by gas. The cited impacts were for six majors.
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plans to leverage oil revenues to accelerate development; large oil and gas discoveries have
also been made in Kenya, Mozambique, and Ivory Coast — the latter an extension of the
Ghana field — which will undoubtedly play heavily in their development agendas as well).28
The issue is not limited to developing countries: the EU has been held back on deepening its
commitments by Poland, which insists on its right to burn its huge reserves of coal.29
The Situation on the Ground 
If the multilateral process is problematic, the situation on the ground appears to be, if anything,
worse. Going into Doha, various assessments had reached the following conclusions, which
Doha did not alter: 
• The World Bank recently reported that “Scientists agree that countries’ current United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change emission pledges and commitments
would most likely result in 3.5 to 4°C warming.”30
• The International Energy Agency now considers 4°C and 6°C scenarios, as well as 2°C, in
its analysis.31
• The OECD Environmental Outlook to 2050 projects 3°C to 6°C warming under current
policies: this degree of warming “would continue to alter precipitation patterns, melt
glaciers, cause sea-level rise and intensify extreme weather events to unprecedented levels.
It might also exceed some critical ‘tipping-points’, causing dramatic natural changes that
could have catastrophic or irreversible outcomes for natural systems and society.”32
• PriceWaterhouseCoopers (PwC) writes that “Governments’ ambitions to limit warming to
2°C now appear highly unrealistic.”33 PwC estimates that the slow start to decarbonization
in the first decade of the 2000s has raised the required annual global carbon intensity
reduction to 5.1 per cent a year from now to 2050, compared to the achieved rate of 0.8 per
cent since 2000.34 “We have passed a critical threshold — not once since World War 2 has
the world achieved that rate of decarbonisation, but the task now confronting us is to
achieve it for 39 consecutive years.”35
• Climate Action Tracker reported during the Doha conference that, taking account of rising
emissions and existing mitigation commitments, the world is now headed for warming of
2.6°C to 4.1°C above pre-industrial levels by 2100.36
28 KPMG, “Oil and Gas in Africa: Africa’s Reserves, Potential and Prospects,” 2013,
http://www.kpmg.com/Africa/en/IssuesAndInsights/Articles-
Publications/Documents/Oil%20and%20Gas%20in%20Africa.pdf, provides an overview of recent developments in
African oil and gas.
29 See note 12 above.
30 Potsdam Institute, Turn Down The Heat, ix.
31 IEA, “Scenarios and Projections,” http://www.iea.org/publications/scenariosandprojections/, under “Energy
Technology Perspectives.”
32 OECD, The OECD Environmental Outlook To 2050: The Cost of Inaction (Paris: OECD, November 2012).
33 PriceWaterhouseCoopers, “Too late for two degrees? Low carbon economy index 2012,” November 2012: 2.
34 ibid., 2.
35 ibid., 1.
36 Marion Vieweg et al., “Governments still set on 3°C warming track, some progress, but many playing with
numbers,” Climate Action Tracker Update, Climate Analytics, PIK, and Ecofys, September 3, 2012,
http://climateactiontracker.org/assets/publications/briefing_papers/2012-09-04_Briefing_paper_Bangkok.pff.pdf.
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To be sure, the complexity of climate change effects and the “noise” in the data due to the
overlay of short-term fluctuations and periodic oscillations on longer-term trends complicate
the assessment of the steepness of the path of global warming on an annual average basis. For
example, the recent pause in average annual temperature increase has been coupled with a
spate of record-breaking summertime heat waves and record ice melt in the Arctic Ocean,
which is promising to open up the Northeast Passage from Asia to Europe for several months a
year (a development that could fundamentally change the economic geography of trade)37 not
to mention the Northwest Passage from North America’s west coast to Europe, traversed by the
Nordic Orion in September-October 2013 carrying coking coal from British Columbia to
Finland (saving around $80,000 in fuel by taking the Arctic route).38 The ice sheets over
Greenland and Antarctic are also losing mass at an accelerating pace.39 Various factors have
been identified to explain the difference in the signals. These include short-term transient
factors, such as solar minimums and volcanic activity; medium-term variability of ocean
surface temperatures, which affects the rate of heat absorption; and increased air pollution in
China. Kosaka and Xie40 suggest that the plateau in global temperature for the last several
years reflects the averaging of more extreme winter and summer temperatures, with the latter
having continued their increase, explaining the heat waves and the record summer melts of
Arctic sea ice. 
Worryingly in this regard, the progress that had been seen in improving carbon intensity of
economic activity appears to have flattened out, notwithstanding the recent intensified use of
natural gas in the United States.41 There are also concerns about the declining efficiency of
carbon sinks (particularly the oceans), which would further raise the bar for required emission
reductions.42 This underscores that a “deus ex machina” technological solution is not emerging
to allow rising GDP to be squared easily with falling emissions. 
37 See Marco Evers, “Northeast Passage: Russia Moves to Boost Arctic Shipping” Der Spiegel, August 22, 2013, for a
recent comment. The Northeast Passage sea route from Hamburg to Shanghai reduces distance travelled from some
20,000 km through the Suez Canal to 14,000 km, or about 30 per cent. Given the conventional gravity-model
estimate of a 1 per-cent increase in trade for each 1 per cent increase in distance, such a reduction, sustained for
several months each year, would have a measurable impact on trade between Europe and Asia.
38 See Danny Bradbury, “Climate change opens up Northwest Passage to commercial shipping,” Business Green
(October 1, 2013).
39 Andrew Shepherd et al., “A reconciled estimate of ice sheet mass balance,” Science 338, 6111 (November 30, 2012):
1183-1189.
40 Yu Kosaka and Shang-Ping Xie, “Recent global-warming hiatus tied to equatorial Pacific surface cooling,” Nature
(August 28, 2013).
41 Joel Makower and the editors of GreenBiz.com, State of Green Business 2012, GreenBiz Group, 2012, 27,
http://www.greenbiz.com/research/report/2012/01/state-green-business-report-2012.
42 S. Khatiwala, F. Primeau, and T. Hall, “Reconstruction of the history of anthropogenic CO2 concentrations in the
ocean,” Nature 462 (2009): 346-349.
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As regards the impacts of climate change, there appears to be a disconnect between the
valuations to the cost of climate change in conventional economic terms and the sense of risk
conveyed by commentaries on climate change. Tol43 surveys the relatively thin core literature
on the economic costs of climate change. The surveyed studies suggest that the impacts on
GDP are relatively small, a few percentage points of GDP, with some positive estimates in the
mix. No recent estimate in Tol’s survey comes close to the OECD44 estimate of the cost of the
2008-2009 recession as a long-term decline in GDP of 3.1 per cent. While the term
“catastrophe” is often used in commentaries on the global financial crisis, the sense usually is
that catastrophe was averted. One may contrast this with the sense conveyed by assessments of
climate change, such as by Wells, that a continuation of recent trends would result in “an
utterly catastrophic 6-degree rise over the next 90 years” (emphasis added).45 Nordhaus46
updates his estimate of the loss from waiting to begin reducing CO2 emissions to US$4.1
trillion in terms of current prices and today’s economy (i.e., about US$575 per capita). While
significant and clearly worth acting on, this does not seem commensurate with “utter
catastrophe.”
There are several inter-related ways to understand this disconnect: non-linearity in the impacts
as temperatures rise, coupled with the risk that positive feedbacks make the heating effect self-
sustaining, thus “baking in” substantially higher future temperature increases; “fat tails” in the
distribution of extreme weather events; and settlement patterns being rendered sub-optimal. 
On the first point, Hansen,47 for example, emphasizes the “predominance of positive
feedbacks” in Earth’s climatic system, which explains why the climate has historically been
“whipsawed between colder and warmer climates, even in response to weak forcings, such as
slight changes in the tilt of Earth’s axis.” In Hansen’s view, the system is already close to a
tipping point, past which the world is more or less committed to a transition to an environment
far outside the range that has been experienced by humanity. From this perspective, the
(relatively marginal) costs of delay evaluated at a (transitory) level of 3°C or under (as in the
studies surveyed by Tol48), using valuation parameters based on the current environment, fall  
43 For small increases in global temperature (1°C), Richard S. J. Tol, “The Economic Effects of Climate Change,”
Journal of Economic Perspectives 23, 2 (2009): 29-51, finds a significant welfare gain equivalent to 2.3 per cent of
GDP. Katrin Rehdanz and David Maddison, “Climate and happiness.” Ecological Economics 52 (2005): 111-125,
evaluating the “amenity value” of climate change on the basis of a 1°C increase in temperature, find a small loss of -
0.4 per cent of GDP, but find that populations in higher latitudes gain under warming scenarios because of a decline
in extremely cold winters, even though those in lower latitudes are less happy because of a rise in extremely hot
summers. David Maddison and Katrin Rehdanz, “The Impact of Climate on Life Satisfaction,” Kiel Working Paper
1658, November 2010, estimate that welfare losses for some countries will be large but (apart from India) not for the
highest emitters of CO2, which, they conclude, does not bode well for prospects of an agreement on emission
reductions.
44 OECD, Economic Policy Reforms: Going for Growth (Paris: OECD, 2010).
45 Katherine Wells, “Recent Climate Change Science, Global Targets and the Global Climate Emergency,” Working
Paper, March 30, 2009, http://bravenewclimate.files.wordpress.com/2009/08/recent_climate_change_science_kw.pdf.
46 William D. Nordhaus, “Why the Global Warming Skeptics Are Wrong,” The New York Review of Books, March 22,
2012.
47 James Hansen, “Tipping Point: Perspective of a Climatologist,” in State of the Wild 2008–2009: A Global Portrait of
Wildlife, Wildlands, and Oceans, ed. W. Woods, (Washington, D.C.: Wildlife Conservation Society/Island Press,
2008), 6-15.
48 Tol, “The Economic Effects of Climate Change,” 29-51.
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far short of capturing the full costs.49 Indeed, if 6°C warming were “utterly catastrophic,” in all
likelihood the engine of that warming — a global industrialized economy — would have
collapsed or, at least, reached a breaking point, causing massive societal change, before enough
GHGs have been emitted to deliver that result by human action alone.50
On the second point, it is useful to contrast findings based on different types of analyses. For
example, Maddison and Rehdanz51 find that Russia is a net beneficiary from warmer winters.
By contrast, the Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research and Climate Analytics52
focuses on Russia’s extreme heat wave of 2010, which, on the basis of preliminary estimates,
resulted in “a death toll at 55,000, annual crop failure at about 25 percent, burned areas at more
than 1 million hectares, and economic losses at about US$15 billion (1 per cent gross domestic
product (GDP)).” Russia’s infrastructure is geared to defending against extreme cold, not
episodes of extreme heat; climate change thus exposed an unprotected flank. Focusing on
average effects versus tail-probability risks thus yields very different perspectives.
To some extent, the issue of extreme events (i.e., tail risks) has been treated formally.
Weitzman53 points out that risk evaluations generally assume truncated thin-tailed probability
density functions. Such evaluations discount heavily the chances of extreme outcomes, which
are comparatively much more likely under fat-tailed distributions, such as the power law,
which describes well phenomena such as the distribution of earthquake intensities. Some argue
that it is nonetheless justifiable to make these assumptions.54 However, as Nordhaus55 concludes,
49 Tol, “The Economic Effects of Climate Change,” 43-46, surveys the literature on “missing effects” not taken into
account in conventional cost-benefit analyses that could generate “nasty surprises” that justify responses greater than
those implied by standard cost-benefit analyses. 
50 Thomas Homer-Dixon, The Upside of Down (Toronto: Alfred A. Knopf Canada/Random House of Canada Limited,
2006) argues that, due to a number of different stresses, including energy (e.g., peak oil), economic (increasing
instability and widening income gaps between the rich and the poor), demographic (runaway population growth and
the increasing number of megacities), environmental (natural resource deterioration, destruction, and contamination),
and climate (global warming) stresses, global industrial civilization will find a breaking point. The Council on
Foreign Relations concluded on the basis that “sharp reductions [in emissions] in the long run are essential to avoid
unmanageable security “problems.” Joshua W. Busby, “Climate Change and National Security: An Agenda for
Action,” Council on Foreign Relations, Special Report 32, November 2007.
51 Maddison and Rehdanz, “The Impact of Climate on Life Satisfaction.”
52 Potsdam Institute, Turn Down the Heat.
53 Martin L. Weitzman, “On Modeling and Interpreting the Economics of Catastrophic Climate Change,” Review of
Economics and Statistics 91.1 (2009): 16. 
54 Weitzman, “On Modeling and Interpreting,” 1-19, proposes a “dismal theorem” that shows that the possibility of
very high temperatures under fat-tailed probability distributions drives expected costs to infinitely or arbitrarily large
values. Since the very high costs in tail events dominate the low probabilities, the theorem implies a high willingness
to pay to preclude even a remote possibility of very high temperatures; Weitzman derives a generalized precautionary
principle on this basis. William D. Nordhaus, “The economics of tail events with an application to climate change,”
Review of Environmental Economics and Policy 5, 2 (2011): 240-57, and Robert S. Pindyck, “Fat tails, thin tails, and
climate change policy,” Review of Environmental Economics and Policy 5, 2 (2011): 258-74, critique the theorem,
arguing that conventional cost-benefit analyses remain valid; and Martin L. Weitzman, “Fat-Tailed uncertainty in the
economics of climate change,” Review of Environmental Economics and Policy 5, 2 (2011): 275-292, responds.
Kirsten Zickfeld et al., “Expert judgments about transient climate response to alternative future trajectories of
radiative forcing,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 106 (2010): 16129-16135, provide a range of
estimates of expert opinion on the mass of probability in the tail with respect to climate sensitivity; Martin L.
Weitzman, “A Precautionary Tale of Uncertain Tail Fattening,” Environmental Resource Economics 55 (2013): 159-
173, provides a discussion of the precautionary principle based on these data. The discussion in this thread serves to
crystallize some of the assumptions that generate the divergence between quantified and subjective views on the size
of climate change risks and the appropriate level of response.
55 Nordhaus, “The economics of tail events with an application to climate change,” 256.
“In many cases, the data speak softly or not at all about the likelihood of extreme events. This
means that reasonable people may have quite different views about the likelihood of extreme
events, such as the catastrophic outcomes of climate change, and that there are no data to
adjudicate such disputes.” 
Finally, there is the issue of location. Industrialization and urbanization went hand-in-hand over
the past two centuries. A vastly disproportionate share of wealth is concentrated in temperate
zones — neither too hot nor too cold. Plants and animals are shifting pole-ward or to higher
elevations as temperatures rise.56 The same is true of pests57 and of marine life.58 However,
human settlements are anchored by existing urban infrastructure, which constitute sunk assets,
and by existing agglomeration externalities.59 Moreover, urban areas typically straddle rivers
(often on flood plains) and/or are located on seacoasts, many in estuaries, and thus face
changes in precipitation patterns and sea-level changes. Accordingly, cities continue to grow in
situ and take adaptation measures60 to deal with the issues and risks associated with climate
change.
Some very recent work is shedding light on the scale of some of these risks. Hallegatte et al.,61
drawing on flood-protection data for 136 coastal cities, estimate that average global flood
losses would rise from approximately US$6 billion per year in 2005 to US$52 billion by 2050
with projected socio-economic change alone. Factoring in climate change-induced higher sea
levels of 0.2 to 0.4 metres, the estimate rises to US$1 trillion or more per year. To maintain
current levels of flood risk in the face of steeply growing capital at risk, adaptation measures
thus would have to reduce flood probabilities below present values. Given residual tail risk, the
magnitude of losses when floods do occur would increase substantially, requiring preparation
for larger disasters than those currently being experienced. Meanwhile, the cost of building up
legacy defences is substantial. New Orleans, for example, has upgraded its storm defences with
a US$14.5-billion, 214-km perimeter, plus 112 km of interior levees and a new outer storm-
surge levee, 2.9 km long and 8 metres high, designed to withstand what is currently rated as
the once-in-a-hundred-year storm. This is on top of the US$75 billion required to recover the
damages of Hurricane Katrina.62 New York is planning a $20-billion upgrade to its defences
following Hurricane Sandy, which was recently evaluated as a once-in-a-seven-hundred-year
56 I-Ching Chen et al., “Rapid Range Shifts of Species Associated with High Levels of Climate Warming,” Science 333,
6054 (2011): 1024-1026.
57 Daniel P. Bebber, Mark A. T. Ramotowski, and Sarah J. Gurr, “Crop pests and pathogens move polewards in a
warming world,” Nature Climate Change (2013).
58 Elvira S. Poloczanska et al. “Global imprint of climate change on marine life,” Nature Climate Change 3 (2013):
919-925.
59 Stéphane Hallegatte, “An Exploration of the Link between Development, Economic Growth, and Natural Risk,” Nota
di Lavoro, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei 29 (2013), argues that development continues notwithstanding natural risk,
even in the absence of climate change or counter-productive incentives such as subsidized insurance or post-disaster
relief. In the dynamic this study sets out: (i) protection improves over time and the probability of disaster occurrence
decreases; (ii) capital at risk — and thus economic losses in case of disaster — increases faster than economic
growth; and (iii) increased risk-taking reinforces economic growth. Average annual losses from disasters grow with
income and, while improved defences reduce the number of disasters, the increased capital at risk results in costlier
disasters when they do occur. 
60 See, for example, a report on Chicago’s adaptation initiatives: Leslie Kaufman, “A City Prepares for a Warm Long-
Term Forecast,” The New York Times, May 22, 2011.
61 Stéphane Hallegatte et al., “Future flood losses in major coastal cities,” Nature Climate Change 3 (2013): 802-806.
62 Simon Veness, “New Orleans heralds recovery from Hurricane Katrina disaster,” The Guardian, February 2, 2013.
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storm,63 but which is estimated to have a much higher return frequency under global
warming.64 A sense of the extent of the requirement for increased levels of defence is provided
by Strauss,65 who found that, by 2100, about 1,400 American towns and cities could be
flooded, including Sacramento and Virginia Beach, if emissions continue unabated.
Similar observations can be made about the adaptation pressures and costs faced by urban
areas dependent on rivers with slowing flows (e.g., communities dependent on the Colorado
River),66 or those faced with increased flooding events as warmer, wetter climate in temperate
zones increases the frequency of what were once considered once-in-a-hundred-year storms,
based on established historical weather patterns,67 and require preparation for still larger events,
the probability of which becomes less remote with climate change.
The contrast between the marginal view of climate change costs and the more catastrophic
perspective is set in sharpest relief by considering prospects for cities such as Miami, which
faces particularly difficult challenges in defending against sea-level rise and extreme storms;68
or Phoenix, which has already reached daunting levels of heat, drought and dust-storms at
current levels of warming and appears to have limited scope for adaptation to further
warming.69
To summarize, longer-term perspectives premised on tipping points that lock in higher levels of
global warming, and that emphasize the impact of large-tail events in the context of limits to
adaptation, support subjectively higher levels of concern than would be implied by a global
reduction of GDP on the order of magnitude found in the mainstream quantitative studies.
63 Timothy M. Hall and Adam H. Sobel, “On the Impact Angle of Hurricane Sandy’s New Jersey Landfall,”
Geophysical Research Letters 40, 10 (2013): 2312-2315.
64 William Sweet et al., “Hurricane Sandy Inundation Probabilities Today and Tomorrow,” Special Supplement to the
Bulletin of the American Meteorological Society 94, 9 (2013): s17-s20.
65 Benjamin H. Strauss, “Rapid accumulation of committed sea level rise from global warming,” Proceedings of the
National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America (2013).
66 The last 14 years have been the driest the Colorado River has seen since record keeping began in the 1800s. See:
Tom Kenworthy, “How Two Reservoirs Have Become Billboards For What Climate Change Is Doing To The
American West,” ClimateProgress, August 12, 2013, http://thinkprogress.org/climate/2013/08/12/2439931/reservoir-
billboards-southwest/. The Colorado River is a major source of water for some 40 million people, 4 million acres of
crops, 22 Native American tribes, 7 national wildlife refuges, and 11 national parks. The two main reservoirs, Lake
Mead and Lake Powell, are now less than half full due to persistent drought. Tourism and energy generation are also
at risk. Julie A. Vano et al, “Understanding Uncertainties in Future Colorado River Streamflow,” Bulletin of the
American Meteorological Society (2013), evaluate a range of climatological studies which project a decline in the
flow of the Colorado River of between 6 and 43 per cent, with estimates in the middle of that range deemed most
probable. They note “the greatest risk to Colorado River streamflows is a multi-decadal drought, like those observed
in paleo reconstructions, exacerbated by a steady reduction in flows due to climate change. This could result in
decades of sustained streamflows much lower than have been observed in the ~100 years of instrumental record.”
(Abstract)
67 For example, the U.K. has had four of the five wettest years on record in the past decade (Damian Carrington, “2012
wettest year on record for England,” The Guardian, January 3, 2013). Similarly, Chicago has had repeated flooding
from storms rated at or approaching 100-year levels, by various definitions, in 2007, 2008, 2010, 2011, and again in
2013, rendering the 1-in-100 standard of little use (Megan Pauly, “Climate change leaves Chicago area in deep
water,” Medill Report, Northwestern University, April 18, 2013). Notably, the 2013 Calgary flood was in the
neighborhood of the 1-in-100-year probability level under two separate evaluations (Matt McClure, “2010 study
warned of more frequent flooding in Calgary,” Calgary Herald, July 18, 2013).
68 See, for example: Strauss, “Rapid accumulation of committed sea level rise from global warming”; for a popular
account, see: Jeff Goodell, “Goodbye, Miami,” Rolling Stone, June 23, 2013. 
69 See: William deBuys, “Phoenix's too hot future,” Los Angeles Times, March 14, 2013.
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Public Perception 
The experience of policymakers in attempting to move climate change legislation forward has
demonstrated that such policy must be firmly rooted in national interests.70 In a global survey
conducted by the Pew Center in March 2013, climate change was ranked by a majority of those
surveyed (54 per cent on average), and was more frequently ranked, as a major threat than any
other suggested risk, including global financial instability, which ranked second.71 Canadian
views were in line with the global average, but Americans were less likely to rank global
warming as a risk, with only 40 per cent listing it as a major threat, a similar percentage to
China (39 per cent).
Public perceptions matter in influencing policy. Australia is a case in point. Australia’s close
encounters with drought, wildfires, and floods related to global warming contributed to it being
one of the few advanced economies to have acted to tax carbon emissions. However, while it
has been an article of faith in Australian politics that a government was unelectable without a
climate change policy, and despite a record-breaking “angry summer,”72 the recent election
brought to power the Abbott government, which campaigned on the abolition of the carbon tax
(albeit with proposed alternatives that were perceived as less threatening to jobs).73
In the United States, a particularly important jurisdiction for global climate change policy,
public perceptions appear to be increasingly driven by extreme events.74 Schiffman,75
commenting on the 2012 U.S. election, which took place against the backdrop of Hurricane
Sandy and record-breaking Midwest heat and drought, observes that “six of the critical swing
states which President Obama won — Colorado, Iowa, Ohio, Virginia, New Mexico, and
Wisconsin — all suffered an uptick of extreme weather events, including massive tornados and
crop-destroying drought, within the past year.” This cuts both ways: In the United States,
concern over climate change was on an upward trend until the dip in early 2013 following an
unusually cold winter.76
70 Terry Townshend et al., GLOBE Climate Legislation Study (London: Globe International, 2011).
71 Pew Research Center, “Climate Change and Financial Instability Seen as Top Global Threats,” June 24, 2013.
72 See, for example: Will Steffen, The Angry Summer (Canberra: Climate Commission Secretariat, 2013).
73 See: Waleed Aly, “Inside Tony Abbott’s Mind,” The Monthly, July 2013, for a description of the new Australian
Prime Minister’s pragmatic political approach to climate change.
74 For example, a Fall 2012 University of Michigan/National Surveys on Energy and Environment (NSEE) poll found
that lived experience was most influential in shifting opinion on climate change in the United States; see:
EcoAmerica, New Facts, Old Myths: Environmental Polling Trends (San Francisco: EcoAmerica, 2013). By the same
token, the Spring 2013 NSEE poll found that the preceding cold winter had chilled public belief in a warming planet;
see: Barry G. Rabe and Christopher Borick, “The Chilling Effect of Winter 2013 on American Acceptance of Global
Warming,” NSEE, University of Michigan, 2013. However, Robert J. Brulle, Jason Carmichael, and J. Craig Jenkins,
“Shifting public opinion on climate change: an empirical assessment of factors influencing concern over climate
change in the U.S., 2002–2010,” Climatic Change (February 3, 2012), examine shifting U.S. public opinion over the
period 2002–2010 and find that the key factors shifting public opinion on climate change are elite cues and economic
factors; extreme weather had no effect on aggregate public opinion, and promulgation of scientific information to the
public on climate change had only a minimal effect.
75 Richard Schiffman, “Election 2012: America's new mandate on climate change,” The Guardian, November 10, 2012.
76 EcoAmerica, New Facts, Old Myths.
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The role of extreme weather in influencing U.S. politics is not likely to diminish: the White
House website, announcing the Obama administration’s June 2013 Climate Action Plan, links
extreme weather to climate change and emphasizes the cost of extreme weather events.77
Moreover, a study by reinsurance giant, Munich Re reports “The intensities of certain weather
events in North America are among the highest in the world, and the risks associated with them
are changing faster than anywhere else.”78 It further reports that North America suffered
US$1.06 trillion in extreme weather damage over the period 1980-2011, with a rising trend,
and with a steep increase in the share of those costs attributed to events described as
“climatological” from a negligible climatological share in the 1980s.79 When the 2012 data are
in the books, that figure will have risen to close to US$1.2 trillion. 
While individual weather events cannot conclusively be linked to climate change in a
deterministic sense (a point almost reflexively made by climate scientists when asked about
events like Hurricane Sandy), they can be so linked in a probabilistic sense. As noted by
Hansen et al., with respect to extreme heat waves, 
“The distribution of seasonal mean temperature anomalies has shifted
toward higher temperatures and the range of anomalies has increased. An
important change is the emergence of a category of summertime extremely
hot outliers, more than three standard deviations (3σ) warmer than the
climatology of the 1951-1980 base period. This hot extreme, which covered
much less than 1 per cent of Earth’s surface during the base period, now
typically covers about 10 per cent of the land area. It follows that we can
state, with a high degree of confidence, that extreme anomalies such as
those in Texas and Oklahoma in 2011 and Moscow in 2010 were a
consequence of global warming because their likelihood in the absence of
global warming was exceedingly small.”80
While the level of concern may wax and wane with events, there has been a more pronounced
shift in belief that global warming is happening and that human action is contributing to it.
Again, looking at the United States where public opinion has generally been less accepting of
climate change, in mid-October 2012, Angus Reid found that 54 per cent of Americans
believed in anthropogenic global warming81 (this has remained consistent through early 
77 The White House, “President Obama's Plan to Fight Climate Change,” June 25, 2013,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/share/climate-action-plan.
78 Munich Re, “Severe weather in North America: Perils, Risk, Insurance,” Knowledge Series: Natural Hazards
(Munich: Munich Re, 2012), preface.
79 ibid.
80 James Hansen, Makiko Sato, and Reto Ruedy, “Perception of climate change” (proceedings of the National Academy
of Sciences of the United States of America, August 6, 2012, abstract).
81 A. Leiserowitz et al., “Climate change in the American mind: Americans’ global warming beliefs and attitudes in
September, 2012,” Yale Project on Climate Change Communication, 2012.
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2013),82 compared to 42 per cent in June 201283 and 36 per cent in 2009.84 Meanwhile, a spring
2012 Brookings Institution poll found that 65 per cent of American adults believe that there is
solid evidence that temperatures have increased during the past four decades, a 13-percentage-
point increase from the low mark recorded in the spring of 2010.85 This number may have
increased, since a more-recent Duke University poll suggests that 84 per cent of Americans
now believe in global warming, with 50 per cent of those “definitely” believing climate change
is occurring.86
To summarize, public belief in the reality of climate change and in anthropogenic causes
appears to be firming; the level of concern appears to be linked to extreme weather events,
which, in a probabilistic sense, can be linked to global warming; and climate change has
political traction. The populist base is thus developing both for action on climate change and
for potential spillovers into the trading system. This could escalate well beyond a proliferation
of trade-remedy cases. Across-the-board tariff walls have been proposed under comparatively
benign circumstances.87 Bhagwati and Mavroidis88 have entertained the possibility of imposing
import bans or punitive tariffs on imports from non‐carbon-regulating countries to enforce the
Kyoto Protocol. And countries like China and India have threatened retaliation.89
A FRAGMENTED RESPONSE
Given the leadership vacuum at the multilateral level, climate change responses are being
driven by a range of players: individual states, sub-national governments (including
states/provinces and cities), plurilateral groups and international institutions, the business
community (in particular, the insurance industry), and private actors in the courts.
Individual Country Responses
Unilateral measures are being taken by many countries, with varying levels of ambition,
conditions, and modalities. A sense of the “waterfront” is provided by the Globe International
survey of national legislative actions.90 The 33 countries surveyed account for 85 per cent of
emissions; accordingly, the sample is representative of what has happened so far on a unilateral
basis.
82 Reported in: Wendy Koch, “More Americans convinced of climate change poll finds,” USA Today, February 7, 2013.
83 Angus Reid, “Global Warming Skepticism Higher in U.S. and Britain than Canada,” June 27, 2012.
84 Pew Research Center, “Fewer Americans See Solid Evidence of Global Warming: Modest Support for ‘Cap and
Trade’ Policy,” 2009.
85 Chris Borick and Barry Rabe, “Continued Rebound in American Belief in Climate Change: Spring 2012 NSAPOCC
Findings,” Governance Studies at Brookings Institution, 2012.
86 Reported in Koch, “More Americans convinced.”
87 For example, U.S. Senator Charles Schumer has, in the past, proposed applying across-the-board tariffs of 27 per
cent on imports from China to counter the alleged undervaluation of the yuan.
88 Jagdish Bhagwati and Petros C. Mavroidis, “Is action against US exports for failure to sign Kyoto Protocol WTO-
legal?” World Trade Review 6, 2 (2007): 299-310.
89 See, for example, Peter Holmes, Jim Rollo, and Tom Reilly, “Border Carbon Adjustments and the Potential for
Protectionism,” Sussex Energy Group Policybriefing 8, May 2010, commenting on the Copenhagen COP discussions
of border carbon taxes.
90 Terry Townshend et al., GLOBE Climate Legislation Study, 3rd Ed. (London: Globe International, 2013).
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The general picture is one of considerable heterogeneity in individual approaches. Key
distinctions include the following:
• Different legal/policy frameworks: climate-change-specific legislation, regulations adopted
within general environmental frameworks, and decarbonization goals embedded in
development plans are all represented;
• Different technical approaches: policies target variously carbon pricing, energy supply,
energy demand, deforestation and land-use change, transportation, carbon sequestration,
and research and development (e.g., into carbon scrubbing from point source and the
atmosphere);
• Different balances between mitigation and adaptation; and
• Different institutions/administrative arrangements.
Townshend et al. characterize the situation as follows: “each country has an individual
approach which reflects its unique institutional context, capacities, economic characteristics
and current level of political engagement with climate change.”91 The flexibility of individual
approaches allows some forward movement; at the same time, it makes it extremely difficult to
make international comparisons for purposes of assessing progress or level-playing-field
issues.
The EU is the most advanced jurisdiction in terms of climate measures, having established the
machinery to manage its carbon emissions and gain operational experience. A Directorate-
General for Climate Action was set up in February 2010 to support climate change negotiations
and to manage the Emissions Trading System (ETS), a cap-and-trade system launched in 2005.
In addition, a number of EU Member States have significant levels of carbon taxes.92
As regards the ETS, on the positive side, it has created a large and liquid market that provides
a carbon price signal for the EU-28 plus Iceland, Liechtenstein, and Norway. It also provides
for trading allowances with non-ETS members, and provides a regulatory mechanism for the
EU to adjust the level of ambition as regards the pace of emission reductions. On the
downside, the scheme still covers only 45 per cent of the EU’s GHG emissions,93 and faces a
serious and growing glut of allowances. The glut stems from the global economic crisis in
2008-2009 and has been exacerbated by the availability of international allowances that serve
as credits within the system, and by an expansion of the supply of allowances in the transition
to the system’s third trading phase, which runs from January 1, 2013 to December 31, 2020. As
a result, there has been a steep drop in the EU carbon price, which has limited the contribution
91 Townshend et al., GLOBE Climate Legislation, 16.
92 The four Nordic countries all have carbon taxes — with Sweden leading in terms of revenue raised with $3.7 billion
— as do the Netherlands, the U.K., and Ireland, among others; see Center for Climate and Energy Solutions,
“Options and Considerations for a Federal Carbon Tax,” February 2013. The Nordic countries, which have had
carbon taxes since the early 1990s, consistently rank amongst the most competitive global economies.
93 The system covers CO2 and some nitrous oxide emissions and is mandatory for power stations, combustion plants,
oil refineries, and iron and steel works, as well as factories making cement, glass, lime, bricks, ceramics, pulp, paper,
and board. The aviation sector was brought into the system at the start of 2012; application to flights operated to and
from countries outside the ETS has been deferred pending a global agreement addressing aviation emissions.
Perfluorocarbons (PFCs) from aluminum production are also covered. Petrochemicals, ammonia, and aluminum
industries and additional gases are to be added to the scheme in 2013.
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of the system to actual reductions in emissions.94 Reforms to the ETS, introduced at the
beginning of 2013, include a single, EU-wide cap on emissions (as opposed to individual
national caps), and a progressive replacement of free allocation of credits by an auction system
as the default method of allocating allowances. Various proposals have been put forward to
deal with the glut;95 in particular, Member States are to consider a back-loading proposal that
was approved by the European Parliament in July 2013.
The EU currently handles competitiveness concerns raised by the ETS through free allowance
allocation,96 although a “carbon equalization system” has been considered to put energy-
intensive industries on similar footing as those in third countries, in order to minimize carbon
leakage.97
The United States presents a complex and fluid picture. Doha was especially disappointing for
the lack of movement by the United States.98 Hurricane Sandy’s US$60-billion-plus worth of
damage to the U.S. East Coast in October 201299 had been linked to the record melt of Arctic
sea ice in September, which set off a train of events that caused Sandy to veer inland. At the
same time, the worst U.S. drought in over 50 years, which turned the promising crop outlook
for 2012 into a disaster, generated costs now estimated in the range between US$50 billion and
US$80 billion.100 Nonetheless, the U.S. negotiating position at Doha remained based on the
pre-election congressional and administration positions. 
In his 2012 presidential acceptance speech, President Obama acknowledged the “destructive
power of a warming planet”101 and a carbon tax was subsequently discussed as a way to avoid 
94 The December 2013 carbon-futures price bottomed out at 2.46 euros/metric ton on the ICE Futures Europe Exchange
on April 17, 2013 following a down vote in the European Parliament on a proposal to backload the issue of new
permits. The price has since rebounded to close at 4.98 euros/mt on Sept. 5, 2013 following a European Commission
decision to pare the issue of allowances 5.7 per cent in 2013, rising to 18 per cent in 2020. This is still well short of
the floor price of 15 euros/mt that is under discussion and the 36.43-euro peak prior to the 2008–2009 crisis. See:
Ewa Krukowska and Alessandro Vitelli, “EU Reduces Free Carbon Permit Allocation Requests by 6% in 2013,”
Bloomberg, September 5, 2013.
95 European Commission, “The state of the European carbon market in 2012,” Brussels COM(2012) 652 final,
November 14, 2012.
96 Kateryna Holzer and Nashina Shariff, “The Inclusion of Border Carbon Adjustments in Preferential Trade
Agreements: Policy Implications” (prepared for X ELSNIT, Annual Conference of the Euro-Latin Study Network on
Integration and Trade, Milan, Italy, October 19-20, 2012), 5.
97 Ibid., 5.
98 Jörg Schindler, “New Hopes Dashed: US Disappoints at Doha Climate Talks,” Der Spiegel, December 5, 2012.
99 See the 2012 Annual Global Climate and Catastrophe Report, which is put out by the world’s largest reinsurer: Aon
Benfield, Annual Global Climate and Catastrophe Report: Impact Forecasting – 2012 (Chicago: Impact Forecasting,
2013). Interestingly, the report observes that 2012 was the seventh consecutive year (since Katrina) that the United
States has not had a major land-falling hurricane, but also that 2010, 2011, and 2012 tied 1887 and 1995 for third
place as the busiest hurricane seasons recorded in the United States. As can be seen, the choice of metrics can colour
perceptions quite significantly.
100
“Extreme Weather: The 2012-2013 U.S. Drought,” Science and Impacts. C2ES, http://www.c2es.org/science-
impacts/extreme-weather/drought. In 2012, the USDA designated 2,245 counties in 39 states as disaster areas due to
drought, with 42 per cent of the contiguous 48 states under “severe to extraordinary drought.” 
101
“President Obama’s acceptance speech (Full transcript),” Washington Post, November 7, 2012.
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both the fiscal cliff and the climate cliff.102 However, the prospects for any form of cap-and-
trade are now generally seen as remote for the foreseeable future,103 and the administration is
taking the path of least resistance and using existing regulatory powers under environmental
laws,104 combined with budgetary support for research towards mitigation and adaptation. The
latest version of the Obama administration’s climate change policy (the Climate Action Plan,
unveiled on June 25, 2013) set a CO2-reduction target of 17 per cent below 2005 levels by
2020, introduced CO2-emission limits for existing power plants (it has already set them for
new power plants), stricter CAFE regulations on fuel efficiency for motor vehicles, home
energy-efficiency upgrades, and targets for increases in renewable power, among other
measures.105 The changed tactics shift the battlegrounds: the House of Representatives slashed
the renewables research budget in July 2013 in a spending bill that faces a White House
veto;106 the National Environment Policy Act requirements for regulatory approvals for new
energy initiatives are now under intense debate;107 and there are signals the Climate Action
Plan will be a wedge issue for the 2014 midterm elections, which will see Senate races in many
coal-rich states.108
China, whose total GHG emissions now match the United States and the EU combined, and on
a per-capita basis are now in the range of the industrialized countries,109 has established quite
ambitious targets for emission reductions, driven by concerns about energy security and the
102 Jonathan L. Ramseur, Jane A. Leggett and Molly F. Sherlock, “Carbon Tax: Deficit Reduction and Other
Considerations,” Congressional Research Service 7-5700, September 17, 2012, survey revenue estimates under a
number of carbon taxes considered or included in deficit- and debt-reduction proposals. The revenue potential was
evaluated as high with a Congressional Budget Office estimate indicating that a tax set at US$20 per ton of CO2
would raise a cumulative total of $1.2 trillion over the 2012 to 2021 budget window. For a commentary, see also
Melissa Zhang, “Beyond China: Carbon Tax in the Post-Sandy Economy,” Berkeley Energy & Resources
Collaborative, BERC China Focus, November 20, 2012.
103 Becky Bowers, “Americans & Australians on carbon-control politics,” PolitiFact, July 30, 2013.
104 Michael B. Gerrard, “Federal Executive Actions to Combat Climate Change,” Environmental Law 249, 49 (March
14, 2013); Mark Drajem, “Obama Will Use Nixon-Era Law to Fight Climate Change,” Bloomberg, March 15, 2013.
105 See: “Climate Change and President Obama’s Climate Action Plan,” The White House, June 25, 2013,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/share/climate-action-plan. For a commentary, see, for example: John Miller, “Can
Obama’s Climate Change Policy Reduce Carbon Emissions?” The Energy Collective, July 2, 2013.
106
“House Defies Obama Administration In Energy Budget Bill,” CBS DC, July 11, 2013.
107 See, for example, the debate about coal exports: Elizabeth Sheargold and Smita Walavalkar, “NEPA and Downstream
Greenhouse Gas Emissions of U.S. Coal Exports,” Columbia Center for Climate Change Law, 2013, and various
contributions from the Heritage Foundation.
108 See: Trip Gabriel, “G.O.P. Sees Opportunity for Election Gains in Obama’s Climate Change Policy,” The New York
Times, July 1, 2013. While many Republicans remain steadfastly in support of more oil and gas drilling on federal
land, redefining “clean energy,” and oppose strict environmental regulations on coal, there are acknowledgements
regarding the need for more research, new financing models for wind and solar power, energy efficiency, and small
modular nuclear reactors. See, for example, the energy proposals by Alaska’s Republican Senator Lisa Murkowski,
Energy 20/20: A Vision for America’s Energy Future (Washington, D.C.: United States Senate, 2013); also see an op-
ed supporting the Obama administration’s Climate Action Plan by four former Republican Environmental Protection
Agency administrators: William D. Ruckelshaus, Lee M. Thomas, William K. Reilly, and Christine Todd Whitman,
“A Republican Case for Climate Action,” The New York Times, August 1, 2013.
109 European Commission, “Emission Database for Global Atmospheric Research (EDGAR),” latest data are for 2010,
http://edgar.jrc.ec.europa.eu/index.php.
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country’s vulnerability to climate change. China succeeded in meeting its 2010 targets of
reducing energy intensity of GDP by 20 per cent and increasing the share of renewables to 10
per cent from 2006 levels. It has set ambitious new targets for 2015: to reduce energy
consumption per unit of GDP by 16 per cent, to reduce CO2 emissions per unit of GDP by 17
per cent, and to increase the proportion of non-fossil fuels to 11.4 per cent of the overall
primary energy mix.110
China has also shot up the ranks in terms of global leadership in installed renewable energy
capacity: “In 2010 China’s annual installations of CSPV solar was just 3 percent of the world
total. But by the end of 2013, analysts expect China’s share to have grown to 21 percent. The
two most significant drivers of domestic demand for solar power in China are feed-in-tariffs, at
both the regional and the national levels, and the national Golden Sun program.”111 China’s
projected domestic demand growth is sufficiently large that the domestic industry, although
presently suffering from over-capacity, will be hard-pressed to meet the needs.
In contrast to the EU, which has formal carbon legislation, and the United States, which uses
environmental regulations, China has primarily targeted carbon emissions through its
development plans.112 China is, however, developing the basis for carbon regulation. It has
been experimenting with emissions-permits trading since the late 1980s, albeit with poor
results. In 2011, China announced it would launch new pilot emission-trading schemes in a
number of cities. It followed that up in July 2012 with the release of The Interim Regulation of
Voluntary Greenhouse Gases Emission Trading in China to govern the carbon-trading
schemes.113 And in June 2013, the first such scheme was launched in Shenzhen. The seven
pilot markets are to provide China with operational experience, while draft national legislation
is under preparation. The problems China must overcome include improving the measurement
of emissions, developing the legal/regulatory infrastructure for emissions trading, and
managing regional disparities. It is likely that the future national system will be based on a
carbon-intensity cap, as opposed to an absolute one, as the former is less controversial for the
Chinese. There is also the possibility of a carbon tax, though the way in which this would fit
with the carbon-trading scheme is yet to be determined.114
Insofar as any pattern is evident, other countries (with Canada a notable exception) are
following the EU’s lead and adopting cap-and-trade frameworks.115 Apart from several EU
110 National Development and Reform Commission, The People’s Republic of China, China’s Policies and Actions for
Addressing Climate Change (published online: Government of China, 2012).
111 ChinaGlobalTrade.com, “China’s Solar Industry and the U.S. Anti-Dumping/Anti-Subsidy Trade Case,” (published
online: ChinaGlobalTrade.com, 2012).
112 Townshend et al., GLOBE Climate Legislation, 105.
113 For a discussion of the process, see: Xiaotang Wang, “Red China Going Green: The Emergence and Current
Development of Carbon Emissions Trading in the World’s Largest Carbon Emitter,” Working Paper, Columbia Law
School Center for Climate Change Law, June 2013.
114 For a full discussion of these issues, see Guoyi Han et al., China’s Carbon Emission Trading: An Overview of
Current Development (Stockholm: FORES, 2012).
115 See the International Emissions Trading Association (IETA), which provides case studies of individual emissions
trading systems in place or in preparation: IETA, “The World’s Carbon Markets,”
http://www.ieta.org/worldscarbonmarkets.
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Member States, Switzerland116 and New Zealand117 have mandatory schemes in place. Japan
has a voluntary ETS in place, while Korea is scheduled to implement one in 2015, albeit in the
face of heavy domestic opposition. Mexico’s law, adopted in 2012, enables, but does not
require, implementation of a cap-and-trade ETS.118 Several other countries have or are working
towards pilot programs.119
While Australia adopted the Clean Energy Future Package in July 2012, which included a
carbon tax and an ETS with broader coverage than the EU ETS and was to be linked to
California’s,120 it is now heading in the opposite direction. Australia’s newly elected prime
minister, Tony Abbott, has made it his top priority to do away with the carbon tax entirely.121
Abbott further plans to shut down the Clean Energy Finance Corporation (CEFC), which was
to finance renewable energy, energy efficiency, and low-emissions technologies.122 He does,
however, have an alternative plan to help reduce Australia’s GHGs: Direct Action, which aims
to dispense AU$3 billion in energy-efficiency grants and subsidies, as well as to support
projects such as the “exploration of soil carbon technologies and abatement, putting carbon
back in soils and providing for a once in a generation replenishment of our farmlands.”123
Australia’s treasury department found that direct action is significantly less cost-effective than
the carbon pricing mechanism. Furthermore, modelling commissioned by the Climate Institute
has also shown that Abbott’s direct action plan will not achieve the 5-per-cent reductions by
2020 that Australia has committed to, but instead will cause emissions to rise a further 9 per
cent, barring an additional AU$4 billion in financing.124
116 The Swiss program was adopted in 2008 as a complement to its CO2 tax. The dual-policy approach allowed
companies to bypass carbon levy payments if they voluntarily joined the Swiss ETS. Beginning in 2013, however,
specified companies became subject to mandatory ETS participation. 
117 New Zealand implemented an economy-wide cap-and-trade scheme in 2008. The New Zealand Emissions Trading
Scheme (the NZETS) will cover nearly all emissions, including all six GHGs identified by the United Nations,
starting Jan. 1, 2015. The scheme is generally similar to the EU’s, although it differs in a number of respects, not
least because the New Zealand emissions profile is very different from the EU’s Greenhouse Policy Coalition. See
Government of New Zealand, “The New Zealand Emissions Trading Scheme,”
http://www.climatechange.govt.nz/emissions-trading-scheme/.
118 Jayni Foley Hein, “Follow the Sun: Mexico On Target to Pass National Climate Change Law,” The Berkeley Blog,
April 16, 2012, http://blogs.berkeley.edu/2012/04/16/follow-the-sun-mexico-on-target-to-pass-national-climate-
change-law/.
119 These include Brazil, India, and Kazakhstan. See IETA, “The World’s Carbon Markets.”
120 Jessica Shankleman, “California and Australia bolster carbon trading ties,” BusinessGreen, July 31, 2013. The future
of this is now up in the air.
121 Rob Wile, “Australia's New Prime Minister Wants To Immediately Dismantle His Country's Fight Against Climate
Change,” Business Insider Australia, September 8, 2013.
122 ibid.
123 ibid.
124 Lenore Taylor, “Climate change: Tony Abbott says Direct Action needs no modelling,” The Guardian, September 5,
2013.
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Canada has no national flagship legislation for climate change, having pulled out of the Kyoto
Protocol effective December 2012. In terms of policy, Canada has frequently been ranked in
recent years as among the world’s worst performers.125 The Government of Canada has,
however, committed to reaching a new international agreement on GHG mitigation as part of
the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action, established in 2011, and has maintained its
commitments to 17-per-cent GHG reductions below 2005 levels by 2020. Canada’s national
policy framework is now comprised of sector-by-sector regulatory approaches to carbon
reduction (including heavy-duty vehicle and renewable fuel content in gasoline, diesel, and fuel
oil), funding support for R&D into carbon capture and storage, promoting green infrastructure,
and financial transfers to provinces.126 That being said, Environment Canada’s own analysis
suggests current federal and provincial programs will only get Canada halfway to its target,127
and the spring 2012 audit of the program indicated that the regulatory approach was not
supported by an implementation plan designed to meet the 2020 targets.128 Furthermore, the
lack of cohesiveness between the provincial and federal governments’ plans militates against
effectively co-ordinated efforts to achieve the targets.129
Given that Canada has explicitly indicated that it is aligning its policies with those of the
United States, it is noteworthy that Canada’s per-capita emissions have closely tracked those of
the United States since 2005. Indeed, for total GHGs, Canada’s emissions fell from 24.31
metric tons (mt)/per-capita of CO2 equivalent in 2005, which was 1.9 per cent higher than the
comparable U.S. figure, to 21.41 mt/per capita in 2010, or 1.0 per cent below the U.S. level.130
This posture and record did not, however, prevent U.S. President Obama from warning that, if
Canada does not tackle GHG emissions, he would not approve the Keystone XL pipeline,
which would bring oil from Alberta’s oilsands to U.S. refineries.131
Plurilateral and International Institutional Responses
The Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) community is putting a growing emphasis on
green growth. This model started in Japan’s chairmanship year in 2010, but has remained
constant and is a major pillar of the three proposed priorities from Indonesia, the current 
125 See, for example, Climate Action Network Canada, “Canada ranked as worst performer in the developed world on
climate change,” December 3, 2012, http://climateactionnetwork.ca/2012/12/03/canada-ranked-as-worst-performer-
in-the-developed-world-on-climate-change/, which placed Canada 58th place out of 61 countries analyzed for their
policies and action on climate change; GermanWatch, “The Climate Change Performance Index: Results 2013,”
November 2012, 5, lists Canada as “the worst performer of all western countries”; and Townshend et al., GLOBE
Climate Legislation listed Canada as the only country going backwards on climate legislation.
126 See Environment Canada, “Reducing Canada’s greenhouse gas emissions,” February 15, 2013,
http://www.ec.gc.ca/dd-sd/default.asp?lang=En&n=AD1B22FD-1. 
127 ibid.
128 Office of the Auditor General of Canada, “Chapter 2—Meeting Canada’s 2020 Climate Change Commitments,” in
2012 Spring Report of the Commissioner of the Environment and Sustainable Development (Ottawa: Office of the
Auditor General of Canada, 2012).
129 Douglas Macdonald et al., Allocating Canadian Greenhouse Gas Emission Reductions Amongst Sources and
Provinces (Ottawa: Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, April 2013).
130 European Commission, “Emission Database for Global Atmospheric Research (EDGAR).”
131 Jim Snyder and Margaret Talev, “Keystone XL watchers try to decipher Obama’s intentions,” Financial Post, August
1, 2013.
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chair.132 The emphasis on green growth, as opposed to sustainability, revolves around the
former having easily measurable benchmarks and is seen as an “operational strategy of
economic system change, where investments in ecological resources and services can also act
as a driver of economic development.”133 APEC seeks the following results from the model:
energy-efficiency improvements, tariff-barrier reductions for environmental goods and services,
and low-carbon sector promotion in member economies.134
The United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD), the Food and
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), and the World Meteorological
Organization (WMO) organized the High Level Meeting on National Drought Policy, which
was held in March 2013. Their combined communiqué noted that climate change has played a
role in exacerbating drought, but the focus of the discussions was on monitoring, mitigation,
and emergency response.135
Activism by Sub-National Governments and Cities
Particularly in North America, but also in some other major jurisdictions, sub-national levels of
government have been out in front of the national governments. 
Individual U.S. states have, for some time now, been much more activist136 than the federal
government and several regional initiatives are up and running in the United States, including
some that are open to Canadian provinces and Mexican states:137
• North America 2050, which involves 16 U.S. States and 4 Canadian provinces (Ontario,
Quebec, British Columbia, and Manitoba), is the successor to the 3-Regions Initiative,
which was a collaboration among members of the three North American regional cap-and-
trade programs: The Midwestern Greenhouse Gas Reduction Accord, the Regional
Greenhouse Gas Initiative, and the Western Climate Initiative. NA2050 is a broader effort,
addressing clean energy in addition to climate change.
• The Western Climate Initiative (WCI) includes the four Canadian provinces in NA2050
plus California. WCI jurisdictions plan to implement cap-and-trade programs, backed up by
a compliance-tracking system that tracks both allowances and offset certificates,
administers allowance auctions, and conducts market monitoring of allowance auctions and  
132 See Lee Poh Onn, “APEC’s Model of Green Growth is a Move Forward,” ISEAS Perspective 10 (2013), 1.
133 ibid., 1-2.
134 ibid., 2.
135 UNCCD, “High Level Meeting on National Drought Policies,” 2012,
http://www.unccd.int/en/programmes/Thematic-Priorities/water/Pages/HLMNPD.aspx.
136 See, for example, Cinnamon Carlarne, “Climate Change Policies an Ocean Apart: EU & US Climate Change Policies
Compared,” Penn State Environmental Law Review 14 (2006): 435; and Patrick Parenteau, “Lead, Follow, or Get out
of the Way: The States Tackle Climate Change with Little Help from Washington,” Connecticut Law Review 40
(2007–2008): 1453, for discussions of U.S. state-level activism in the mid-2000s.
137 See: Center for Climate and Energy Solutions, “Multi-State Climate Initiatives,” http://www.c2es.org/us-states-
regions/regional-climate-initiatives.
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the trading of allowances and offset certificates. California138 and Quebec139 are set to move
forward with cap-and-trade in 2013.
• The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI), which is comprised of 10 northeastern
states, has been running since 2008, although several states are withdrawing their participation
(including, interestingly, New Jersey, which was savaged by Hurricane Sandy).140
• The Transportation Climate Initiative (TCI), which includes 12 northeast and mid-Atlantic
jurisdictions, is a collaborative effort to develop clean energy and reduce GHG emissions in
the transportation sector.
A fifth regional initiative, the Midwest Greenhouse Gas Reduction Accord (MGGRA), which
was a commitment by the governors of six Midwestern states and the premier of one Canadian
province to reduce GHG emissions through a regional cap-and-trade program and other
complementary measures, failed to get off the ground after a model cap-and-trade rule was
proposed in April 2010.
In Canada, Quebec (in 2007) and British Columbia (in 2008) have implemented carbon
taxes.141 B.C.’s revenue-neutral tax (revenues are returned to consumers primarily through
income and business tax reductions) is substantially higher than Quebec’s and has resulted in a
17.4-per-cent GHG emission reduction — without impairing the provincial economy,
according to a study to be published in Canadian Public Policy.142
In Japan, the Tokyo Prefecture (in 2010) and Saitama Prefecture (in 2011) have recently
launched mandatory cap-and-trade systems. 
Cities have increasingly taken a leadership role on climate change,143 reflecting the fact that,
while the focus of climate change concerns has been agriculture, it is the major cities — most
of which are located on the coasts — that are the most vulnerable to extreme weather events.
The C40, which is chaired by New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg, was established in
2005 as a forum to bring together mayors of the world’s largest cities to discuss urban
solutions to the climate crisis. Their actions range from promoting electric vehicles in Oslo, to
banning Styrofoam food containers in New York,144 to introducing a city carbon tax in Boulder,
Colorado, and the San Francisco Bay area. Additionally, they are largely funding their own
initiatives: the Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP) has estimated that about two-thirds of city
initiatives are funded through general municipal funds.145
138 See: Center for Climate and Energy Solutions, “California Cap and Trade,” November 2012, http://www.c2es.org/us-
states-regions/key-legislation/california-cap-trade.
139 See: MDDEFP, “The Québec Cap and Trade System for Greenhouse Gas Emissions Allowances,” 2012,
http://www.mddefp.gouv.qc.ca/changements/carbone/Systeme-plafonnement-droits-GES-en.htm.
140 Matthew Wald, “Carbon Trading Initiative a Success, Study Says,” The New York Times, November 15, 2011. 
141 Alberta has also implemented a penalty on excess carbon emissions, which has sometimes been described as a
carbon tax. See Mark Jaccard, “Alberta’s (Non)-Carbon Tax and Our Threatened Climate,” Sustainability Solutions,
April 26, 2013.
142 Sustainable Prosperity, “BC’s Carbon Tax Shift After Five Years,” July 24, 2013,
http://www.sustainableprosperity.ca/article3685.
143 See Cynthia Rosenzweig et al., “Cities lead the way in climate-change action,” Nature 467 (October 21, 2010): 909-
911.
144 See the address delivered by New York City Mayor Michael R. Bloomberg, “2013 State of the City Address,” Press
Release PR-063-13, February 14, 2013.
145 Derek Top, “How cities are leading the way in climate change fight,” GreenBiz.com, June 20, 2012.
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Business-Sector Initiatives 
Assessments of environmental sustainability efforts by mainstream companies suggest that
there is a sustained momentum to meet environmental goals, based on longer-term strategic
policies, but that the gains being made fall short of what is needed. 
The State of Green Business 2012 report observes as follows:
“ … companies continue to make, meet, and even exceed ambitious
environmental goals related to their use of materials and resources, the
emissions of their operations (as well as their suppliers’), the efficiency of
their offices and factories, the ingredients of their products, and what
happens to those products at the end of their useful lives. Beyond that,
companies continue to innovate, buoyed by ongoing waves of new
technologies and emerging business models that emphasize experience and
access over ownership and consumption.”146
The report also makes an important point concerning what is driving corporate interest in
sustainability. First, transparency initiatives: 
“Growing calls for transparency and disclosure of sustainability impacts are
requiring more, and more reliable, information about increasingly deeper
levels of company operations and supply chains. Ratings and stock indices,
such as those from Newsweek and Dow Jones, are being taken ever more
seriously by companies, elevating the collection and dissemination of key
data to the C-suite.”147
Secondly, shareholders: “Shareholder resolutions focusing on social and environmental issues
made up the largest portion of all shareholder proposals in 2010 and 2011. That further bonds
sustainability with board-level interest.”148
The more recent State of Green Business 2013 discusses some “profound shifts” that occurred
in 2012, leading businesses to “link their sustainability strategy to critical business activities”
after a series of extreme environmental events impacted supply chains. For example, flooding
in Thailand cut off global supplies of computer disk drives for the better part of a year, record-
low water levels in the Mississippi River seriously impaired shipping,149 and Hurricane Sandy
shut down Wall Street for two days and impaired its functioning for weeks.150
146 Makower et al., State of Green Business 2012, 4.
147 ibid., 6.
148 ibid., 6.
149 See American Waterway Operators, “Economic Impacts Revised for Potential Mississippi River Closure to Barge
Traffic in January,” Press Release, January 2, 2013.
150 Joel Makower and the editors of GreenBiz.com, State of Green Business 2013, GreenBiz Group, 2013, 7,
http://www.greenbiz.com/research/report/2013/02/state-green-business-report-2013.
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The report emphasizes 10 key trends for 2013 in the green-business world, of which the
following are the most relevant for this paper: 
• With the signing of the Natural Capital Declaration by 39 global financial institutions
(notably, no major U.S. banks) at the Rio+20 United Nations conference, natural capital is
becoming a watchword in business circles. This declaration commits signatories to valuing
nature’s role in the global economy,151 a vital step to accounting for the services rendered
by, for example, intact swathes of old growth forests and marine sanctuaries. Natural capital
was further emphasized as an important business value when the World Bank’s
International Finance Corporation (along with 76 global banks) signed on to the Equator
Principles, committing to account for the impacts and the dependencies on ecosystem
services of potential financing projects.152
• Unsurprisingly, risk and resilience also feature on the report’s list of trends, as these two
factors emphasize a company’s (and indeed the trade system’s as a whole) ability to adapt
to, and work through, violent and extreme weather events. Not only does climate impact
companies’ production and trade infrastructure, but concerns regarding the availability of
energy, water, and other resources, as well as the security of employees and customers, are
also very real.153
• The re-localization of the economy (“think global, buy local”) has been gaining ground,
especially through such aspects as mobile and web searches, which now emphasize not only
the biggest, but also the closest dealers, businesses, etc. for a search.154 This has led to the
rise of community currencies (alternative currencies that can only be spent locally), which
is clearly anti-international-trade-minded. 
Another broad perspective, regarding what the major corporations are doing to prepare
themselves for the various economic shocks that climate change will unleash, is provided by
the Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP).155 The CDP invites over 6,000 companies globally to
report on their climate change strategies, GHG emissions, and energy use.156 Carbon Action,
the CDP’s carbon-related program, has grown from 35 to 92 signatories, who collectively
represent US$10 trillion in assets, and respondents reported a reduction of 497 million tonnes
of CO2, totaling US$11 billion in 2012.157 Unfortunately, due to the high uncertainty, subdued 
151 ibid., 9.
152 ibid., 9-10.
153 ibid., 12.
154 ibid., 19. Econometric evidence generally finds that increased trade increases emissions. See, for example, World
Trade Organization and UNEP, Trade and Climate Change (Washington, D.C.: WTO, 2009), 53. However, since
trade allows more efficient producers to capture market share, the carbon savings on transportation can be more than
offset by increased carbon production by more energy-intensive local producers. Anca Cristea et al., “Trade and the
greenhouse gas emissions from international freight transport,” Journal of Environmental Economics and
Management 65,1 (2013): 153-173, find that to be the case in one-quarter of the manufacturing sectors they study. 
155 The CDP’s 2012 report was based on 279 responses received by July 1, 2012, though it did receive a total of 405
responses (an 81-per-cent response rate). See: Carbon Disclosure Project, Business resilience in an uncertain,
resource-constrained world, 2012, 4, https://www.cdproject.net/CDPResults/CDP-Global-500-Climate-Change-
Report-2012.pdf.
156 Carbon Disclosure Project, Carbon reductions generate positive ROI: Carbon Action report 2012, 2012, 2,
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growth, and volatile commodity prices faced by businesses in 2012, “few [companies] are
setting the necessary targets or making the investments required to ensure their long-term
resilience.”158 PwC further finds that, on average, the longer-term targets of CDP respondents
are only about 1-per-cent emissions-reduction per year,159 despite the CDP reporting that
“investments in reduction projects are generating attractive returns well in excess of cost of
capital.”160 In fact, the average return on climate-related investment (ROI) is 33 per cent, with
88 per cent of projects exceeding firm-level return on invested capital (ROIC).161 The CDP
demonstrates that those companies who are not investing in reductions are not only setting
themselves up for higher climate-related risks later on, as well as economic risks related to the
likely pricing of carbon in due time, but are also missing out on “high return opportunities to
create financial value for their investors — irrespective of the environmental benefits.”162
One particularly important private sector player is Walmart, given its influence over the
distribution of goods at the retail level. In 2009, Walmart initiated an assessment of companies
and products in its supply chain concerning the carbon content embedded in its products. The
initiative involved three phases: a survey of its suppliers based on 15 questions that would also
“serve as a tool for Walmart’s suppliers to evaluate their own sustainability efforts”;163 the
launch of the Sustainability Consortium, a group of universities “that will collaborate with
suppliers, retailers, NGOs and government to develop a global database of information on the
lifecycle of products — from raw materials to disposal”;164 and a proposal to translate the
Consortium’s data into a rating system that would allow consumers to make purchases based
on the sustainability of products. The Sustainability Consortium, a global multi-stakeholder
organization developing science-based tools that advance the measurement and reporting of
consumer-product sustainability, was ranked in the top 10 “World Changing Ideas for 2012” by
Scientific American.165
There have also been important developments in the progress of measuring the embedded
carbon footprint of products. A research team from Columbia University’s Earth Institute’s
Lenfest Center, using a lifecycle-analysis database that covered 1,137 PepsiCo products, has
applied data-mining techniques used by Facebook and Netflix to predict consumer preferences
to rapidly calculate the carbon footprints of thousands of products simultaneously. The research
team suggests that the software should help companies to accurately label products and design
ways to reduce their environmental impacts, while substantially reducing the costs and
personnel requirements of making such assessments.166
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Meanwhile, the Sustainable Apparel Coalition (SAC), which has developed the Higg Index to
enable clothing companies to identify environmental and societal impact reductions for their
products, counts among its members such notables as Walmart, Target, Adidas, Burberry, Coca-
Cola, Columbia, Patagonia, Gap, H&M, Nike, and Levi’s.167 The SAC’s 60 members, which
“account for more than a third of the global apparel and footwear industry,”168 aim to produce
no “unnecessary environmental harm” and to positively impact the communities and people
with which they are associated.169 While shoppers will have to wait awhile until labels with
scores appear on products, companies have started using the index to measure energy use,
GHG emissions, water consumption, etc.
The shipping and airlines industries, which were both excluded from the Kyoto process
because of the trans-boundary nature of their business, have also developed a consensus on
what needs to be done in preparation for emissions reductions and higher carbon prices. 
In July 2011, the International Maritime Organization (IMO) agreed to a range of technical and
operational measures for new and existing vessels to help control emissions through increased
fuel efficiency, including an energy-efficiency design index for new vessels and reductions in
ship speed. This will be implemented on new ships in 2015.170 Additionally, ports in northern
Europe are switching to liquefied natural gas (LNG) in order to meet their target of 40-per-cent
GHG reductions from 2005 levels by 2050, a target set by the EU for the shipping industry.
Two companies, Swedegas (Swedish infrastructure) and Vopak (Dutch oil and gas storage)
have announced a $155.3-million investment in LNG in the port of Gothenburg.171
The International Air Transport Association (IATA) meanwhile has launched a global Carbon
Offset Program, producing its offset guidelines, which included 19 IATA members in the
program.172 At the beginning of 2012, the EU imposed a cap on the aviation industry’s carbon
emissions by including commercial flights within and between EU ETS countries (except
Croatia, until January 1, 2014) under the ETS. The inclusion of flights to and from countries
outside the ETS was deferred to allow time for an international solution to be reached
regarding these emissions. The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) agreed, in
October 2013, to develop a global market-based mechanism by 2016 to address international
aviation emissions and to bring it into force by 2020.173
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The Insurance Sector
The insurance industry is particularly involved in both assessing the risks of climate change
and in addressing its negative consequences. Mike Kreidler, insurance commissioner for the
state of Washington, has even labeled climate change a “serious financial threat to the
insurance industry.”174 Such financial worries have prompted the industry to become “a
significant voice in world policy forums addressing [climate change], as well as a market force,
investing at least $23 billion in emissions-reduction technologies, securities, and financing,
plus $5 billion in funds with environmental screens, seeing risks to investments in polluting
industries and opportunities in being part of the clean-tech revolution.”175 In fact, according to
a study published in Science, 378 insurance entities in 51 countries are behind 1,148 climate
change adaptation and mitigation activities, representing $2 trillion of industry revenue.176
Insurance companies even offer “pay-as-you-drive” car insurance, which calculates premiums
based on distance driven. Proponents of the initiative suggest it may reduce U.S. driving by 8
per cent and oil use by 4 per cent.177
Litigation
A development that has potential repercussions for international commerce is action through
the courts. As Klaus Töpfer, then executive director of UNEP, commented in 2002, “Liability is
the decisive economical instrument that demands commitment.”178 And, notwithstanding
skepticism about the ultimate efficacy of such an approach,179 a growing number of cases has
been brought; a sufficient number, in fact, for the British Academy to host a conference on the
courts’ emergence as “battlefields in climate fights.”180
For the most part, the cases brought have been under national laws (with the United States
leading the way), but some of the cases involve trans-border issues. 
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For example, in 2009, the Federated States of Micronesia filed suit against the Czech CEZ
Corporation regarding the latter’s proposal to extend by 25 years the life of the Prunéřov coal-
fired power station, Europe’s dirtiest power plant, emitting 11.1 million tons of CO2 annually.
This was the first instance of the international law principle of trans-boundary harm being
applied to climate change.181 The Micronesian islands are among the most threatened territories
from sea-level rise and they have petitioned for multilateral action to limit global warming to
1.5°C. In recent years, abnormally high tides have damaged the soil and salted aquifers,
making it impossible to grow staple foods and forcing the government to make emergency
shipments of rice and drinking water, at a cost of 7 per cent of its budget.182 The International
Court of Justice (ICJ) found in favour of Micronesia, requiring CEZ to take measures to offset
its emissions. 
As a result of this precedent, the Inupiat Eskimos of Alaska sued 19 U.S. oil and utility
companies based on the fact that the companies’ GHG emissions are melting the sea ice on
which the Inupiats’ town is founded, forcing residents to move the community at a cost of $400
million.183 In this case, the original defendant, AES, assigned responsibility for the defence to
its insurer, Steadfast, which contested this assignment. The case generated great interest since it
addressed the question of whether an insurance company has to “foot the bill for a company
facing damages over climate change.”184 Moreover, it was the first such case to reach an
appellate court.185 The Virginia Supreme Court ultimately held that an insurer has no duty to
defend or indemnify against climate-change-related injuries under the terms of its general
commercial-liability insurance policy. However, as a number of observers have pointed out, the
court’s specific judgment would have little precedential force outside of Virginia, because it
was narrowly based on the interpretation of the specific language in the legal contract.186
In a related case, the island of Palau has requested an opinion from the ICJ regarding the
responsibilities that GHG-emitting states have for the harm their emissions cause to the small
island states.187 Korman and Barcia188 argue that an ICJ advisory opinion could help create a
181 Rachel Morris, “The People v. CO2: The coming tide of international climate lawsuits,” Slate, April 20, 2010. 
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new international norm against trans-boundary harm caused by GHG emissions and clarify the
principles against which state action could be measured, facilitating negotiations towards an
inclusive, binding agreement at the UNFCCC. Regardless, Matthew Pawa, one of the attorneys
that worked on the Inupiat lawsuit, likens these climate cases to the court battles surrounding
the tobacco and asbestos companies: “Just by bringing these cases over and over again, the
judiciary [and] the public get used to the idea of liability.”189
A third trans-border case involved the unsuccessful challenge to the EU ETS scheme by the
U.S. airline industry before the European Court of Justice (ECJ). Of particular note is the
combative tone of the industry in response to the judgment and the forum-shopping it signaled
in its statement following the decision:
“Today’s court decision further isolates the EU from the rest of the world
and will keep in place a unilateral scheme that is counterproductive to
concerted global action on aviation and climate change. The court did not
fully address legal issues raised and has established a damaging and
questionable precedent by ruling that the European Union can ignore the
Chicago Convention and other longstanding international provisions that
have enabled governments around the world to work cooperatively to make
flying safer and more secure, and to reduce aviation’s environmental
footprint.
Today’s decision does not mark the end of this case and Airlines for
America (A4A) is reviewing options to pursue in the English High Court. At
the same time, the U.S. government and dozens of others around the world
are increasing pressure on the EU to come back to the table to consider a
global sectoral approach.”190
At the national level, the United States has been the main testing ground for climate change
litigation. While a full survey of this activity is well beyond the scope of the present paper, two
key points have emerged: (a) U.S. court decisions have established the right of private parties
to require governments to regulate on climate change issues where these fall within the ambit
of existing law; and (b) the courts have become a battleground.
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As of 2007, at least 35 cases involving climate change arguments had been filed,191 and there
have been many more since,192 under various statutes including the Clean Air Act (CO2 as
pollution),193 the Clean Water Act (CO2 as contributing to ocean acidification),194 the
Endangered Species Act (climate-change-related destruction of habitat),195 and the Global
Change Research Act (failure of the federal government to carry out required research on
climate change).196
Most prominent is the 2007 case, Massachusetts et al. v. EPA et al., in which a group of private
petitioners, cities, and agencies joined the State of Massachusetts and 11 other states to sue the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) for failure to regulate automobile emissions
contributing to climate change, thus endangering public health and safety. The case went to the
Supreme Court, which found that (a) the case was justiciable; (b) the harms associated with
climate change are serious and well recognized; (c) given the EPA’s failure to dispute the
existence of a causal connection between manmade GHG emissions and global warming, its
refusal to regulate such emissions, at a minimum, “contributed” to Massachusetts’ injuries; and
(d) while regulating motor-vehicle emissions may not by itself reverse global warming, it does
not follow that the court lacks jurisdiction to decide whether the EPA has a duty to take steps to
slow or reduce it. While the Supreme Court decision was controversial on the first point,197 the
other aspects of the decision provide a basis for courts to rule on climate-change-related suits.
The court ruled that GHGs are indeed “air pollutants” and should be considered as such under
the Clean Air Act (CAA). It further ordered the EPA to conclude scientifically whether new
motor vehicles’ GHG emissions endanger public health and welfare. 
In December 2009, the EPA issued an endangerment finding, which concluded that six classes
of GHGs cause global climate change and that new motor vehicles contribute to GHG
pollution, further endangering public health and welfare. This led to the imposition in May
2010 (taking effect in January 2011) of the Tailpipe Rule, which established GHG-emission
standards for light-duty motor vehicles created between 2012 and 2016. Various state and
industry group petitioners subsequently challenged these actions (as well as its Timing and
Tailoring rules, which imposed construction and operating permit requirements on large,
stationary GHG producers, such as power plants, refineries, and cement-production facilities),
alleging that the CAA does not allow for these regulations and that they are otherwise
“arbitrary and capricious.” The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
disagreed on all points.198
191 Michael B. Gerrard, “Survey of Climate Change Litigation,” Environmental Law 238, 63 (September 28, 2007).
192 See the U.S. Litigation Charts maintained by the Center for Climate Change Law at Columbia University. The center
also maintains non-U.S.-litigation charts. Center for Climate Change Law, “Resources,” 2013,
http://web.law.columbia.edu/climate-change/resources#litigation-charts, under “Litigation Charts.”
193 For example: Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438 (2007).
194 Center for Biological Diversity v. EPA; for a discussion, see Robin Kundis Craig, “Climate Change Comes to the
Clean Water Act: Now What?” Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and the Environment 1, 1 (2010): 9-
49.
195 Natural Resources Defense Council v. Kempthorne, (E.D. Cal. 2007).
196 Center for Biological Diversity v. Brennan, (N.D. Cal. 2007).
197 For a discussion, see: David S. Green, “Massachusetts v. EPA Without Massachusetts: Private Party Standing in
Climate Change Litigation,” University of California, Davis, Environs 36, 1 (2012): 35-63.
198 Center for Climate and Energy Solutions, “Clean Air Act Cases,” 2012, http://www.c2es.org/federal/courts/clean-air-
act-cases. In fact, this finding stated that not only were the endangerment finding and the Tailpipe Rule not arbitrary or
capricious, but also that the EPA's CAA interpretation with regards to stationary sources is “unambiguously correct.”
32
A subsequent case that also went to the Supreme Court, Connecticut v. American Electric
Power (AEP), is particularly notable in that the Supreme Court ruled that the CAA, and the
EPA’s ongoing steps to implement the CAA, displaced a federal common-law public-nuisance
claim to limit CO2 emissions. While this effectively removed this path to a remedy through the
federal courts, it did not preclude pursuit of remedies: 
“… in narrowing its holding to displacement, the Supreme Court in AEP
declined to rule on preemption and the viability of state law tort claims,
which the plaintiffs also pled. Rather than forestall the filing of future
climate change litigations, the AEP holding simply crystallizes the forum
and the likely claim, namely, state-law nuisance. In several respects, state
courts present a more hospitable forum for such litigation. Thus, by
relegating these claims to state courts, hence implicitly authorizing such
claims to continue in those forums, the Court’s decision in AEP may
effectively increase the number of climate change litigations filed in state
courts in the coming years.”199
While the consequences for the trading system are far from clear at this point, the important
takeaway point is that this activity is not going away, but apparently building. Moreover, as it
has commercial consequences, there are likely to be knock-on effects for the trading system in
due course.  
THE INTERSECTION OF CLIMATE CHANGE MEASURES AND TRADE RULES
Squaring Climate-Change-Mitigation Measures with Trade Rules
There is no inherent incompatibility between environmental and trade rules.200 The UNFCCC
and the Kyoto Protocol both have articles (Arts 3.5 and 2.3 respectively) that provide that
“measures taken to combat climate change should not constitute a means of arbitrary or
unjustifiable discrimination or a disguised restriction on international trade.”201 Meanwhile,
preservation of the environment is enshrined as a fundamental principle of the WTO,202
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200 This issue was exhaustively studied in the 2000s as the first wave of concern with trade and climate change was
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alongside the objective to reduce barriers and eliminate discriminatory practices in
international trade relations. Discussions among WTO members of the Committee on Trade
and Environment (CTE) indicate a general consensus that a successful outcome of the Doha-
Round trade negotiations would have delivered a “triple-win” in terms of trade, environment,
and development:203
• For the environment, by improving countries’ ability to obtain high-quality environmental
goods at low cost or by enhancing the ability to increase production, exports, and trade in
environmentally beneficial products; and by encouraging the use of environmental
technologies, which can in turn stimulate innovation and technology transfer;
• For development, by assisting developing countries in obtaining the tools needed to address
key environmental priorities as part of their on-going development strategies; and
• For trade, by making environmental goods and services (EG&S) less costly and allowing
efficient producers of such technologies to find new markets.204
Unfortunately, the negotiations to reduce barriers to trade in EG&S have stalled with the Doha
Round.
There is a general consensus that the ideal way to handle trans-boundary environmental issues
is through a multilateral environmental agreement (MEA).205 There are some 200 MEAs in
force at present, of which 20 incorporate trade measures.206 The experience in reconciling
MEAs with WTO rules has been positive: no formal dispute involving an MEA measure has so
203 WTO, Committee on Trade and Environment in Special Session, “Report by the Chairman, Ambassador Manuel A. J.
Teehankee, to the Trade Negotiations Committee,” TN/TE/20, April 21, 2011.
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on “environmental goods and services” but provided no definition, leaving this open to negotiation. A narrow
definition focuses on abatement solutions (e.g., solar panels, wind turbines, and batteries). A broader definition
includes goods produced with environmentally friendly technologies or having environmentally beneficial
characteristics, such as biodegradability; see: World Bank, International Trade and Climate Change: Economic,
Legal, and Institutional Perspectives (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2007), 12. The OECD has 164 goods on its
environmental-goods list, APEC has 109, and the “Friends of EGs” group of WTO Members has 153; see Fahmida
Khatun, Trade Negotiations on Environmental Goods and Services in the LDC Context (New York: UNDP, August
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Lists,” OECD Trade and Environment Working Paper 2005-04 (2005), 11, Table 2, only 27 per cent of the OECD
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34
far been brought to the WTO,207 several MEA secretariats are observers in the WTO’s Trade
and Environment Committee, and there has been extensive co-operation and information
exchange between the WTO and MEA secretariats.208 The Montreal Protocol on ozone-
depleting substances is the poster child for successful implementation of an environmental
agreement that includes trade restrictions as an incentive for compliance that were
accommodated within the GATT/WTO trade rules.209
This experience provides a basis for some optimism concerning the prospects for an eventual
similar, seamless integration of multilaterally sanctioned climate change measures with
multilateral trade rules. Armed with a newly-reached multilateral climate change agreement
that provides for mitigation measures, and given the guidance of the 1969 Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties and the legal principles of “lex specialis” (the more specialized
agreement prevails over the more general) and of “lex posterior” (the agreement signed later in
date prevails over the earlier one), WTO panels and the Appellate Body would likely be able to
resolve disputes in a generally satisfactory and widely-accepted manner. Moreover, the
International Standards Organization (ISO) is negotiating standards for climate change (and
has already adopted four standards regarding requirements for quantification and reporting of
GHG emissions and reductions)210 and the WTO could look to these less political forums for
standards that have some legitimacy when addressing technical questions.
That being said, the scale of the problems addressed successfully to date is vastly smaller than
that of climate change. Moreover, a multilateral climate change agreement has yet to
materialize and mitigation measures are being implemented outside of a MEA. 
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Seventeenth Meeting of the Committee on Trade and Environment in Special Session, 1-2 March 2007: Note by the
Secretariat,” TN/TE/R/17, April 18, 2007.
209 See UNEP, Vital Ozone Graphics: 25th Anniversary of the Montreal Protocol, 3rd ed. (Geneva: Division of
Technology, Industry and Economics (DTIE) OzonAction Branch, GRID-Arendal, Zoï Environment Network, and
the Ozone Secretariat, 2012). Because of the incentive for producers in complying parties to shift production to non-
parties, trade measures were introduced, banning export to and import from non-parties, not only of the substances
but also of the technology to produce the substances. Accordingly, during the phase-out period, non-party exporters
lost markets in the complying states and non-party importers faced supply restrictions. Alongside the trade
restrictions, positive measures were implemented to facilitate compliance by developing countries. The trade
restrictions thus worked to create an incentive to join the Protocol. Non-compliance by parties could result in trade
bans in the controlled substances and suspension of the positive measures. The Protocol did not include other
punitive enforcement mechanisms. Given the importance of near-total coverage of production of CFCs, the trade
measures were an important mechanism for ensuring success of the initiative; at the same time, their accommodation
under the GATT agreement precluded any conflict with the multilateral trade rules. For a discussion, see: Donald M.
Goldberg et al., “Effectiveness of Trade & Positive Measures in Multilateral Environmental Agreements: Lessons
from The Montreal Protocol,” prepared for the United Nations Environment Programme by the Center for
International Environmental Law, CIEL, 1997. 
210 See World Trade Organization. “Activities of the WTO.”
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Trade and Climate Change: Emerging Conflicts
CONFLICT SPILLOVER: FROM CLIMATE CHANGE TO TRADE
Climate change represents, in some sense, the accumulated negative externality associated with
the economic gains of two centuries’ worth of industrialization. The bill is coming due, but no
funds have been set aside to cover it. To carry the metaphor forward, nature is an
uncompromising creditor and the debt cannot be rescheduled, there are no tidy records to
apportion the necessary haircuts, and there is no bankruptcy court to enforce an orderly
settlement. In a “sauve-qui-peut” scramble, the international community is seizing the non-co-
operative lose-lose-lose outcome implied by the failure to reach the co-operative win-win-win
outcome described hopefully in official discussions. What does that scenario look like?
The conflicts and tensions that prevented successful conclusions of trade and climate change
talks in the Doha/Doha scenario have not disappeared; rather they are waiting to express
themselves in new forms. Taking as a given that the knowledge and capability is there to arrest
climate change, the issue is one of investment. The amounts required are large and uncertain
and it is highly likely that the risk-return metrics are such that the private sector will not step
forward to make the funds available. Rather, the climate change debts will have to be largely
socialized and paid for with taxes.
But while the public will be footing the bills, the agents that deliver the solutions will mostly
be private companies: manufacturing solar panels, providing mitigation engineering services or
energy audits, or introducing new energy-efficient production technologies, for example. By
the same token, governments will have every incentive to (a) position their support for
mitigation initiatives as support for “future growth industries” and (b) prevent leakage of
economic benefits to third parties in the absence of agreed burden sharing. 
And there is no lack of evidence that this is happening. For example, China reportedly
provided $47.5 billion of credit to its solar panel industry “to wrest supremacy from Germany,
Japan and the United States.”211 President Obama, meanwhile, in his 2012 State of the Union
address, stated the following: 
“In three years, our partnership with the private sector has already
positioned America to be the world’s leading manufacturer of high-tech
batteries. Because of federal investments, renewable energy use has nearly
doubled … I will not cede the wind or solar or battery industry to China or
Germany because we refuse to make the same commitment here.”212
In Germany, which is breaking solar energy production records from month to month, solar
energy producers are going bankrupt. The dynamic in solar is following the pattern set in the
DRAM (digital-storage) wars of the 1980s, (as discussed below).213
211 Bloomberg, “Sun has set on China’s bid to build solar economy,” September 10, 2013.
212 The New York Times, “President Obama’s State of the Union Address,” January 25, 2012.
213 For an account of the DRAM wars, see: Dan Ciuriak, “The Return of Industrial Policy,” working paper, May 7,
2013; and Kenneth Flamm and Peter C. Reiss, “Semiconductor Dependency and Strategic Trade Policy,” Brookings
Papers on Economic Activity, Microeconomics 1 (1993): 249-333.
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The clash with trade rules, which provide no “green box” for environmental subsidies214 and
condemn specific subsidies and local-content requirements, is teed up. By the same token, the
spillover into the trading system of the failure to establish multilaterally-agreed burden sharing
in the climate change forums seems pre-ordained. 
Thus, as production and trade in biofuels have grown to meet GHG-reduction targets, pressures
for trade protection have also grown in that sector. The WTO reports that, since 2000, 37
measures on biofuels have been notified by 20 WTO members in the context of the Agreement
on Technical Barriers to Trade.215 More recently, a slew of measures have been taken under
anti-dumping and anti-subsidy law with respect to solar- and wind-power generation, in some
cases in thinly disguised tit-for-tat retaliatory fashion.
• On January 6, 2012, the United States announced it would launch an investigation into
subsidization of wind-power equipment from China and Vietnam.216
• On September 6, 2012, the EU announced that it had opened an anti-dumping investigation
into imports of Chinese solar panels worth 21 billion euros (US$26.5 billion) in 2011,
making this the largest anti-dumping investigation ever. The complaint was lodged by EU
ProSun, an ad hoc association representing more than 20 European companies producing
solar panels and their key components.217 
• On November 7, 2012, the U.S. International Trade Commission (ITC) affirmed the anti-
dumping and countervailing measures, resulting in combined anti-dumping-duty and
countervailing-duty rates of 23.75 per cent to 254.66 per cent.218
• On November 8, 2012, the EU launched an anti-subsidy investigation into the same
products.219
• On November 26, 2012, China initiated an investigation into imports, from the U.S., South
Korea, and the EU, of polysilicon, the main input into production of solar panels; Chinese
authorities indicated that they would also investigate U.S. and EU subsidies for polysilicon
makers.220
214 The “green box” for allowable environmental subsidies established in the Uruguay Round was allowed to expire in
2000 and has not been replaced, but environmentally damaging fossil-fuel subsidies have been tolerated within the
WTO system.
215 World Trade Organization. “Activities of the WTO.”
216 U.S. International Trade Commission, Utility Scale Wind Towers from China and Vietnam (Washington, D.C.:
USITC, 2012).
217 European Commission, “EU initiates anti-dumping investigation on solar panel imports from China,” Memorandum
12/647, September 6, 2012.
218 The original complaint was filed on Oct. 19, 2011 by a number of U.S.-based solar manufacturers. On March 20,
2012, the U.S. Department of Commerce made an affirmative preliminary determination in the countervailing-duty
investigation and, on May 17, 2012, in the companion anti-dumping investigation. Definitive dumping and
countervailing-duty finds were announced by the commerce department on Oct. 10, 2012. See
ChinaGlobalTrade.com, China’s Solar Industry and the U.S. Anti-Dumping/Anti-Subsidy Trade Case, May 2012,
http://www.chinaglobaltrade.com/sites/default/files/china-global-trade-solar-manufacturing_may2012_0.pdf.
219 European Commission, “EU initiates anti-dumping investigation on solar panel imports from China,” Memorandum
12/844, November 8, 2012.
220 Feifei Shen, “China Starts Dumping Probe Into Polysilicon From U.S., Europe,” Bloomberg, November 26, 2012.
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• On February 28, 2013, the EU announced it was initiating a new dumping investigation into
imports of solar glass from China. The complainant was ProSun Glass; the EU market in
this case is relatively small at less than 200 million euros in annual sales.221
CONFLICT SPILLOVER: FROM TRADE FRICTION TO WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT
The inevitable spillover of trade frictions into the WTO’s dispute-settlement system is also
underway. A series of climate-change related trade actions and disputes have been initiated: 
• On September 13, 2010, Japan requested consultations with Canada regarding the domestic-
content requirements in Ontario’s feed-in tariff program (the “FIT Program”).
• On December 22, 2010, the United States requested consultations with China with respect
to measures concerning wind-power equipment.222
• On August 11, 2011, the EU also requested consultations with Canada regarding Ontario’s
FIT program.
• On August 23, 2012, Argentina requested consultations with the EU and Spain concerning a
Spanish measure that denied eligibility of biofuel imports to meet the EU-mandated biofuel
targets.223
• On November 5, 2012, China requested consultations at the WTO with the EU regarding
measures that affect the renewable-energy-generation sector.224 The challenge addressed
domestic content restrictions related to the feed-in tariff of EU Member States, including,
but not limited to, Italy and Greece.
• On February 6, 2013, the United States requested consultations with India over domestic
content requirements in its Jawaharlal Nehru National Solar Mission program, which is a
key part of India’s climate change program. Japan and Australia joined the consultations.
On August 4, 2013, the consultations concluded without an agreement being reached.225 On
221 European Commission, “EU initiates anti-dumping investigation on solar glass from China,” Memorandum 13/153,
February 28, 2013.
222 See: World Trade Organization, “China — Measures Concerning Wind Power Equipment,” WT/DS419/1 G/L/950
G/SCM/D86/1, January 6, 2011.
223 World Trade Organization, “European Union And A Member State — Certain Measures Concerning The Importation
Of Biodiesels, Request for Consultations by Argentina,” WT/DS443/1 G/TRIMS/D/30 G/L/994, August 23, 2012.
Australia and Indonesia joined the consultations and on Dec. 6, 2012 Argentina requested the establishment of a
panel. This action was suspended after Spain withdrew the measures. Spain adopted the measure in retaliation for
Argentina’s nationalization of the controlling interest held by Spain’s Repsol SA in Argentinian oil company YPF SA,
which is also Argentina’s largest employer and second-leading exporter. While the nationalization of YPF could not
be challenged under WTO rules, the Spanish government signaled that it would take “decisive” action against
Argentina. However, the measure it chose could be challenged under WTO rules and Spain was forced to retreat. This
incident is noteworthy in terms of the revealed strength of the WTO rules as far as they go.
224 World Trade Organization, “European Union and certain Member States — Certain Measures Affecting the
Renewable Energy Generation Sector,” WT/DS452/5, November 5, 2012.
225 See, World Trade Organization, “India – Certain Measures Relating to Solar Cells and Solar Modules,” DS456,
March 13, 2013, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds456_e.htm.
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April 18, 2013, India filed a communication in the WTO Committee on Subsidies and
Countervailing Measures that posed a series of questions to the United States concerning a
number of federal and state subsidy programs to promote renewable energy that India
indicated had local content requirements.226
• On February 6, 2013, the United States requested consultations with India over domestic
content requirements in its Jawaharlal Nehru National Solar Mission program, which is a
key part of India’s climate change program. Japan and Australia joined the consultations.
On August 4, 2013, the consultations concluded without an agreement being reached.225 On
April 18, 2013, India filed a communication in the WTO Committee on Subsidies and
Countervailing Measures that posed a series of questions to the United States concerning a
number of federal and state subsidy programs to promote renewable energy that India
indicated had local content requirements.226
• On May 15, 2013, Argentina requested consultations with the EU and its Member States
regarding measures affecting importation of biodiesel and measures supporting the
biodiesel industry (WTO DS459). 
Further, there is an evolving conflict over the EU’s amendments to the Fuel Quality Directive
(FQD). This 2009 amendment, known as the Low Carbon Fuel Standard, requires fuel
suppliers to reduce the GHG intensity of fuel for road transport by 6 per cent by 2020. To do
this, the EU is developing a methodology to differentiate the GHG outputs of different types of
fuel. The FQD draft proposal gives diesel produced from oilsands (natural bitumen) an
emission value of 108.5 gCO2 eq/MJ (grams of CO2 per Mega Joule), while diesel from
conventional crude has a value of 89.1 gCO2 eq/MJ.227 This would put Canadian oilsands fuel
at a significant trade disadvantage with regards to exports to the EU. The FQD was not
developed as a trade measure, but as a GHG-reduction technique to meet the EU’s other
international commitments. Natural Resources Minister Joe Oliver has recently backed away
from his threats to bring the EU to the WTO for trade relief, as Canada and the EU were in the
midst of negotiations for the Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA).
On solar, while the European Commission accepted a price undertaking from Chinese
exporters on August 2 2013, which the Commission indicates removes the harm from dumping,
the parallel anti-dumping and anti-subsidy investigation continue. The Commission has
indicated it is prepared “to include the anti-subsidy investigation into the undertaking at the
definitive stage, should such action be warranted.”228 Moreover, provisional duties would be
applied if the volume of imports exceeds a volume limit specified in the undertaking
agreement. The risk of a wider EU-China trade spat has not yet been fully resolved.
226 See World Trade Organization, Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, “Questions Posed by India to
the United States under Article 25.8 of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures — State Level
Renewable Energy Sector Subsidy Programmes with Local Content Requirements,” G/SCM/Q2/USA/59, April 18,
2013. For a discussion see Liesbeth Casier and Tom Moerenhout, “WTO Members, Not the Appellate Body, Need to
Clarify Boundaries in Renewable Energy Support,” IISD Commentary, July 2013.
227 Ab De Buck et al., Economic and environmental effects of the FQD on crude oil production from tar sands (Delft,
Netherlands: CE Delft, May 2013).
228 European Commission, “European Commission continues anti-subsidy investigation on solar panels from China
without duties,” Press Release, August 7, 2013.
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THE CANADA – FIT DISPUTE
The challenges by Japan and the EU to measures promoting the renewable-energy-generation
sector in Canada229 have gone the distance.230 In light of the preceding discussion, this case is
notable for several reasons. 
• First, it targets measures implemented by a sub-national government taken under a climate
change action plan explicitly for the purposes of meeting Canada’s international obligations
to reduce GHG emissions.231 The sub-national government in this case is also out in front of
its national government, which has become conspicuous for its lack of action on climate
change.232 Recall the shift in leadership on climate change to sub-national levels.
• Second, the Ontario measures notably restrict the local content requirements to within-
province companies, consistent with the “sauve-qui-peut” hypothesis. 
• Third, as the Panel noted, the objectives of the FIT Program include enabling “new green
industries through new investment and job creation” and the provision of “incentives for
investment in renewable energy technologies.”233 This is consistent with the expectation of
a blurring of environmental and industrial policy aims. 
• Fourth, in the amicus brief jointly submitted by the International Institute for Sustainable
Development (IISD), Canadian Environmental Law Association (CELA), and Ecojustice
Canada, it was suggested that the Panel, in considering the applicability of the subsidies and
countervailing measures (SCM) disciplines, give “due consideration to the special character
of environmental measures,” which is the “green box” by another name.
• Fifth, the case proved too complex for the established WTO panels to reach a conclusion by
the appointed deadlines, resulting in two extensions of the timetable to produce the reports;
this is consistent with the concerns regarding lack of policy guidance from the legislative
side of international law.
In brief summary, under Ontario’s FIT program, generators of electricity produced from
specified forms of renewable energy are paid a guaranteed price per kilowatt-hour of electricity
delivered into the Ontario electrical grid. Eligibility to participate in the program is restricted to 
229 World Trade Organization, “Canada — Certain Measures Affecting the Renewable Energy Generation Sector,”
WT/DS412/R, March 13, 2013; and World Trade Organization, “Canada — Measures Relating to the Feed-In Tariff
Program,” WT/DS426/R, December 19, 2012.
230 See, World Trade Organization, “Canada — Measures Relating to the Feed-In Tariff Program,” August 8, 2013,
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds426_e.htm. 
231 See the amicus submission of Blue Green Canada, “WTO Called Upon to Dismiss Japan, EU Challenge to Canadian
Renewable Energy Policy,” May 14, 2012, http://bluegreencanada.ca/node/75. See Daniel Peat, “The Perfect FIT:
Lessons for Renewable Energy Subsidies in the World Trade Organization,” LSU Journal of Energy Law and
Resources 1, 1 (2012): 43-66, for a description of the worldwide prevalence of feed-in tariff programs and their
contribution to renewable-energy generation.
232 Climate Action Network, “Canada ranked as worst performer in the developed world on climate change,” ranked
Canada as having the worst climate change policy of all wealthy nations, and the fourth-worst of all nations in its
Climate Change Performance Index 2013.
233 World Trade Organization, “Canada — Measures Relating,” para. 7.109.
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Ontario-based generators and depends on the purchase and use of certain types of renewable-
energy-generation equipment sourced in Ontario in the design and construction of the facilities.
The complainants argued that the FIT program accorded less favourable treatment to imported
equipment than that accorded to like products originating in Ontario, in violation of the
national treatment obligation under GATT Article III:4; that the measures imposed domestic
content requirements in violation of Article 2.1 of the Agreement on Trade-Related Investment
Measures (TRIMs), which prohibits requirements for “the purchase or use by an enterprise of
products of domestic origin or from any domestic source”; and that the measures constituted a
prohibited import-substitution subsidy under Articles 3.1(b) and 3.2 of the Agreement on
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM).234
Canada argued that the measures constituted government procurement covered by the
exemption in GATT III:8 and thus were not subject to WTO disciplines.235 Notably, Canada
declined to incorporate the amicus briefs in its defence, thereby allowing the panels to
disregard them.236
On December 19, 2012, the panels rendered a joint verdict, upholding the complainants’ claim
that Canada was in violation of its national treatment obligation and the WTO restrictions on
local content requirements.237 However, regarding the illegal subsidy claim, there was a divided
ruling: the Panel’s majority dismissed the claim, but offered the observation that, if rates of return
on the challenged contracts were compared with the average cost of capital in Canada for projects
having a comparable risk profile in the same period, it might be possible to demonstrate a
“benefit” under the terms of Article 1.1(b) of the SCM Agreement.238 One member of the Panel,
however, found that the complainants had in fact demonstrated a conferred “benefit” since the
pricing offered to relatively high-cost and less-efficient suppliers enabled them to enter the
wholesale electricity market, which they otherwise would not have been able to do.239
Both sides appealed particular aspects of the panels’ decision.240 The Appellate Body reversed
some of the panels’ intermediate rulings, but upheld the main conclusions that the disputed
contracts were not covered by the government procurement exclusions and therefore were
covered by, and stood in violation of, the national treatment requirement and the prohibition on
domestic content requirements.241 However, while the Appellate Body reversed the panels’
determination that the complainants had failed to establish a benefit under the SCM Agreement,
it did not complete the analysis, leaving open the question of whether the challenged measures
confer a benefit within the meaning of Article 1.1(b) of the SCM Agreement and whether
Canada acted inconsistently with Articles 3.1(b) and 3.2 of the SCM Agreement.
234 ibid., para. 3.1 and 3.4.
235 ibid., paras 7.86 et seq.
236 ibid., paras 1.12–1.13.
237 ibid., paras 8.2–8.3.
238 ibid., para. 7.323.
239 ibid., paras 9.1 et seq.
240 World Trade Organization, “Canada — Certain Measures.”
241 World Trade Organization, Appellate Body, “Canada – Certain Measures Affecting the Renewable Energy Generation
Sector; Canada – Measures Relating to the Feed-In Tariff Program,” WT/DS412/AB/R WT/DS426/AB/R, May 6,
2013, EU-143, 6.1 (a) (vi).
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This dispute has important systemic implications on a number of counts. 
First, the Appellate Body’s confirmation of the panels’ interpretation of the scope of the
government procurement carve-out from WTO obligations clarifies that WTO law governing
national treatment and local content requirements apply. In the present case, this imposes the
requirement to permit leakage through trade with respect to measures taken to deal with an
issue on which there has been a breakdown in international co-operation. In other words, trade
law requires states that shoulder the costs of addressing climate change to give states that are
free riders on climate change equal opportunity to the commercial benefits.242 This unsound
combination — a breakdown in collective action in one sphere and the enforcement of
multilateral rules in a related second sphere — is an instantiation of the classic “second-best”
problem243 and is bound to express itself in numerous ways.244
Second, whereas trade law reinforced environmental policy in reducing the use of ozone-
depleting substances by creating incentives to be inside the agreement rather than outside, in
this case the reverse is true. This consideration underscores the cost of not having an MEA in
place: whereas a multilateral or plurilateral agreement would enable the parties inside the
agreement to safely discriminate against non-parties, thereby mitigating the efficiency costs of
local content requirements,245 this is not possible in the current circumstances.
Third, while the Appellate Body’s decision leaves residual uncertainty over the interpretation
of the SCM for feed-in tariff programs, it provided a very detailed and important discussion.246
In particular, the Appellate Body emphasized the importance of taking into account both
supply-side and demand-side structures in identifying the relevant market, making the
following key points:
• Under current technological circumstances, markets for solar-PV- and wind-generated
electricity can only come into existence as a matter of government supply-mix regulation
and the definition of a certain supply mix by the government cannot in and of itself be
considered as conferring a benefit within the meaning of the SCM Agreement;247
242 This is not to imply that the countries bringing the case are free riders themselves; the EU clearly is not, being well
ahead of the international community. Our point is much more fundamental: the Appellate Body requires allowing
free ridership to any and all, including, in Ontario’s case, other provinces.
243 The original theory of second best is due to Richard G. Lipsey and Kelvin Lancaster, “The General Theory of
Second Best,” Review of Economic Studies 24, 1 (1956): 11-32. The essential point for the present narrative is that
slavish insistence on first-best trade rules results in a politically untenable requirement to allow free ridership on
climate change mitigation. For a recent and interestingly nuanced comment on the theory of second best, see
“Making the Second Best of It,” The Economist, August 21, 2007.
244 See, for example, the arguments made by Ellen Gould, “First, Do No Harm: The Doha Round and Climate Change,”
CCPA Briefing Paper: Trade and Investment Series, March 2010, 16, on applying GATS (General Agreement on
Trade in Services) rules to climate change measures.
245 See Jan-Christoph Kuntze and Tom Moerenhout, Local Content Requirements and the Renewable Energy Industry –
A Good Match? (Geneva: ICTSD, May 2013) for a discussion of the efficiency costs of local content requirements.
246 Did the Appellate Body punt in not completing the analyses, as both Japan and the EU requested it to do? The
Appellate Body stated that it was “unable” to complete the analysis, implying that the facts in the case record were
insufficient to allow a determination. The EU appears to have anticipated this eventuality, as it further requested:
“Should the Appellate Body be unable to complete the analysis,” that it “declare moot and of no legal effect [certain
of] the Panel's findings and conclusions.” World Trade Organization, Appellate Body, “Canada – Certain Measures,”
para. 2.148. 
247 ibid., 5.175.
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• Renewables have very different supply characteristics than conventional energy sources
and, therefore, electricity from different generation technologies is not substitutable at the
wholesale level;248
• The definition of the energy-supply mix will generally reflect a variety of policy
“imperatives,” including to reduce reliance on fossil fuels for sustainability reasons and to
address the negative and positive externalities that are associated with conventional- and
renewable-electricity production (respectively, one assumes);249
• Benefit benchmarks for solar-PV- and wind-generated electricity should be found in the
markets for solar-PV- and wind-generated electricity that result from the supply-mix
definition;250 and
• On the demand side, electricity from different sources is not necessarily indistinguishable
since consumers may be ready to pay more for electricity that draws on renewable
sources.251
These clarifications of the Appellate Body’s views will, arguably, make it difficult for
complainants to win a subsidy case on feed-in tariffs in the future. The Appellate Body’s
approach to the issue appears to be in the spirit of the decision of the European Court of Justice
(ECJ) on the German FIT program, the only prior judicial ruling on the subsidy aspects of a
feed-in tariff, although it is based on very different grounds. The ECJ deemed that the German
program did not constitute a subsidy since there was no impact on a public budget; WTO rules
allow a determination of an illegal subsidy even in the absence of budgetary impacts.252
This element of the Appellate Body’s decision has proved to be controversial — although not
so much with regard to FITs: as Casier and Moerenhout,253 point out, some 99 countries now
have FITs in place and a FIT without local content requirements is unlikely to be challenged in
the first place. Rather, as they and Lester254 both suggest, this interpretation in effect reopens a
carve-out for green subsidies that lapsed with the green box as of January 1, 2000 and raises
questions for how it might be applied in other contexts, in particular the potentially expansive
reading that could be given to the following elaboration by the Appellate Body:
“ … a distinction should be drawn between, on the one hand, government
interventions that create markets that would otherwise not exist and, on the
other hand, other types of government interventions in support of certain
players in markets that already exist, or to correct market distortions therein.
Where a government creates a market, it cannot be said that the government
intervention distorts the market, as there would not be a market if the  
248 ibid., 5.176.
249 ibid., 5.177.
250 ibid., 5.190.
251 ibid., 5.177.
252 Marie Wilke, “Getting FIT for the WTO: Canadian green energy support under scrutiny,” BioRes 5, 1 (2011).
253 Casier and Moerenhout, “WTO Members.”
254 Simon Lester, “The AB Carves Out Some Policy Space for Clean Energy Subsidies,” International Economic Law
and Policy Blog, May 6, 2013, http://worldtradelaw.typepad.com/ielpblog/2013/05/the-ab-carves-out-some-policy-
space-for-clean-energy-subsidies.html.
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government had not created it. While the creation of markets by a
government does not in and of itself give rise to subsidies within the
meaning of the SCM Agreement, government interventions in existing
markets may amount to subsidies when they take the form of a financial
contribution, or income or price support, and confer a benefit to specific
enterprises or industries.” (at 5.188)
The issue for the trading system here is that, in the absence of specific legislation dealing with
clean energy, the attempt to give “green readings” to general law can cause unanticipated
problems elsewhere.
The Appellate Body decision did not address two other key elements of a subsidy case:
specificity and adverse effects. Given the very narrow focus of a FIT, it seems difficult to
conceive of a challenged FIT not being found to be specific (although Casier and Moerenhout
caution that this is not an open-and-shut question, depending on how the measure is
constructed).255 The more important issue, it seems, is adverse effects: since electricity grids
are inter-connected, the integration of large amounts of intermittent electric power from solar
and wind through export surges can cause trade friction, as has already happened in the case of
Germany’s rapid expansion of renewable energy.256 These issues would likely come into play
in non-FIT cases.
Finally, Canada’s decision not to mount an Article XX defence of the measures257 likely
deprived the Appellate Body of the opportunity to build on its discussion of the use of this
measure for climate change exceptions in Brazil – Tyres.258
255 We would note in passing that subsidies that address externalities ought to be specific to be efficient — the more
specific the better. For example, Gene Grossman, “Promoting new industrial activities: a survey of recent arguments
and evidence,” OECD Economic Studies 14 (1990): 87-125, 118, commenting on the use of subsidies to promote
new industries, observes that “arguments for industrial policy do not apply across the board, nor is there any
presumption that the prerequisites for intervention to be beneficial will be satisfied for a majority of high-technology
ventures. The nature of the problem makes case-by-case analysis unavoidable” (emphasis added). Further, while
subsidization of abatement of a negative externality is clearly inferior in economic terms to taxing the cause of the
externality, under the polluter-pays principle — see, for example, Alan O. Sykes, “The Economics of WTO Rules on
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures,” John M. Olin Law & Economics Working Paper 186 (2d Series), 2003, on
this point — in a context where the appropriate remedy to climate change (a carbon tax) has not been widely applied
— subsidization of abatement becomes imperative. There is no obvious reason why, in this context, subsidies should
be designed to be horizontal, which might reduce their effectiveness. This points to an unsound construction in WTO
law.
256 The issues so far have been limited to the engineering sphere (Poland and the Czech Republic are building switches
to cut off excess green-energy surges) and have not spilled over into trade issues. See Institute for Energy Research,
“Germany’s Green Energy Destabilizing Electric Grids Wind,” January 12, 2013,
http://www.instituteforenergyresearch.org/2013/01/23/germanys-green-energy-destabilizing-electric-grids/.
257 Peat, “The Perfect FIT,” 59-61, emphasizes the importance of a construction suitable for Article XX defence in his
list of criteria.
258 See: World Trade Organization, Appellate Body, “Brazil – Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres,” AB-
2007-4, adopted December 17, 2007, para. 151. Gould, “First, Do No Harm,” 5, draws attention to the relevance of
the Appellate Body’s ruling in this case for possible climate change exceptions under Article XX. The Appellate
Body used climate change as an example of a problem where latitude needs to be granted to governments, although
climate change was not an issue addressed in the case.
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UNILATERAL MITIGATION AND BORDER CARBON ADJUSTMENTS
The various unco-ordinated measures to address climate change, coupled with the major
differences in energy taxes across jurisdictions, have resulted in the emergence of a “two-speed
carbon world.”259 Carbon leakage and competitiveness concerns inevitably arise in those
countries that impose a carbon price.
These concerns are ultimately based on the Pollution Haven Hypothesis (PHH), which argues
that, in a liberalized trade world, industry will move from the country with the more stringent
environmental regulations to those with laxer regulations.260 The evidence is mixed on the
significance of this phenomenon: the earlier literature261 characterized the effects as modest;
more recently, Levinson and Taylor262 provide evidence that they are more significant than
previously thought. 
While the high degree of international competitiveness of countries that have long-standing
carbon taxes in place (e.g., the Nordic countries and the Netherlands), it is clear that
competitiveness and carbon-leakage concerns drive governments to considering border carbon
adjustments (BCAs).263 BCAs address competitiveness concerns raised by domestic carbon-
related measures by charging an equivalent carbon price on imports and rebating the carbon
price on exports. BCAs also address carbon leakage, by reducing the concern that industry
would move to carbon-intensive countries, thereby diluting the carbon reductions aimed for by
cap-and-trade.264
There are also costs. BCAs necessarily generate costs of administration and cost of compliance
for firms. There is a risk — indeed a good likelihood — that they will be abused for
protectionist reasons; anti-dumping provides insights into how a BCA regime is likely to
unfold in the latter regard, including the extent to which the system has been used for rent-
seeking protectionism, the recent rise of tit-for-tat retaliation, and the frequency of resorting to
dispute settlement. Use of BCAs is likely to be divisive, as was made clear when this issue was
a hot topic at the Copenhagen COP. BCAs also have been characterized by some analysts as 
259 Dieter Helm, Cameron Hepburn, and Giovanni Ruta, “Trade, climate change and the political game theory of border
carbon adjustments,” Centre for Climate Change Economics and Policy Working Paper 92 (2012).
260 The early formulations of the Pollution Haven Hypothesis are due to Rüdiger Pethig, “Pollution, welfare, and
environmental policy in the theory of comparative advantage," Journal of Environmental Economics and
Management 2, 3 (1976): 160-169; and Brian R. Copeland and M. Scott Taylor, “Trade, Growth, and the
Environment,” Journal of Economic Literature 42 (1994): 7-71. Zhong Xiang Zhang, “Competitiveness and Leakage
Concerns and Border Carbon Adjustments,” Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Nota di Lavoro 80 (2012), provides a
recent survey. 
261 See, for example, Adam B. Jaffe, Steven R. Peterson, and Paul R. Portney, “Environmental Regulation and the
Competitiveness of U.S. Manufacturing: What Does the Evidence Tell Us?” Journal of Economic Literature 33, 1
(March 1995): 132-163; and Matthew A. Cole, “Trade, the pollution haven hypothesis and the environmental
Kuznets curve: examining the linkages,” Ecological Economics 48 (2004): 71-81.
262 Arik Levinson and M. Scott Taylor, “Unmasking the Pollution Haven Effect,” International Economic Review 49, 1
(February 2008): 223-254.
263 For example, in the United States, Waxman-Markey included a requirement for importers to purchase emission
allowances and a similar requirement is likely to be incorporated in any U.S. action on climate change (Helm,
Hepburn, and Ruta, “Trade, climate change.”)
264 For a detailed description, see: Aaron Cosbey et al., “A Guide for the Concerned: Guidance on the elaboration and
implementation of border carbon adjustment,” Entwined Policy Report 3 (November 2012).
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generating economic-efficiency costs on grounds that they constitute trade protection.265 On the
last issue we would argue that trade protection is only inefficient when markets are efficient;
however, when markets are inefficient and fail to internalize significant costs, the corrective
measure is efficient.266 Furthermore, even if the BCA is applied at an excessive level and thus
provides a certain amount of (inefficient) protection, it remains a tax, which is the most
efficient form of protection (i.e., it is a transfer payment rather than a deadweight cost of
compliance).
While controversial, the scholarship on BCAs suggests that they can be accommodated within
the WTO rules, but much depends on the legal interpretation of particular provisions of the
GATT, and there is no existing scheme in place as a proof of concept. There are daunting
practical challenges to implementing such a scheme in a way that is environmentally efficient
and non-trade-distorting, while remaining administratively feasible with reasonable levels of
compliance costs on firms. And there are non-trivial diplomatic issues that would arise from
unilateral approaches. That being said, the developments in tracking carbon in the corporate
world are making the problems of measurement more tractable, and the Appellate Body’s
decision in Canada – FIT signals that BCAs implemented in the context of a credible domestic
carbon-mitigation policy could be accommodated within the WTO scheme. We briefly review
these issues below. 
Accommodation Under WTO Rules
WTO rules provide for internal taxes and charges that are applied to domestically-produced
goods to be applied on an equivalent basis to imported goods. Moreover, as Pauwelyn267
observes, “ … the flip-side of the right to impose a domestic tax also on imports is the right to
rebate the same tax on domestic products that get exported. Under WTO rules, such rebates are
not considered to be prohibited export subsidies.” In general, the tax must be applied to the
product and not the producer: i.e., it must be structured like an excise or value-added tax,
which is levied on the product, but cannot be structured like a payroll tax that applies to the
producer.268 The tax on imports can be applied at time of import (GATT Article II:2) or upon
re-sale or use inside the border (GATT Article III:2).269 The same general principles would
265 For example: Joost Pauwelyn, “Carbon Leakage Measures and Border Tax Adjustments under WTO Law,” in
Research Handbook on Environment, Health and the WTO, ed. D. Prevost and G. Van Calster (Cheltenham, UK:
Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd., 2012), 5-7.
266 See Helm, Hepburn, and Ruta, “Trade, climate change,” for a discussion.
267 Pauwelyn, U.S. Federal Climate Policy, 17.
268 ibid., 17-18.
269 GATT Article II:2 provides that “Nothing in this Article shall prevent any contracting party from imposing at any
time on the importation of any product: (a) a charge equivalent to an internal tax imposed consistently with the
provisions of paragraph 2 of Article III with respect to the like domestic product or with respect to an article from
which the imported product has been manufactured or produced in whole or in part.” The cross-referenced GATT
Article III:2 states: “The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the territory of any other
contracting party shall not be subject, directly or indirectly, to internal taxes or other internal charges of any kind in
excess of those applied, directly or indirectly, to like domestic products. Moreover, no contracting party shall
otherwise apply internal taxes or other internal charges to imported or domestic products in a manner contrary to the
principles set forth in paragraph 1 [which forbids measures that afford protection to domestic products].” For recent
WTO jurisprudence, which elaborates definitively on the distinction between these two provisions, see WTO
Appellate Body, “China – Measures Affecting Imports of Automobile Parts,” WT/DS339/AB/R, adopted January 12,
2009, paras 158 and 164.
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likely apply to the border adjustment for domestic measures that are imposed as regulations
rather than taxes.270 This provides some leeway in terms of how a BCA might be structured,
while remaining compatible with WTO obligations.
Much depends on the specifics of the domestic program and the framing of the corresponding
border offsets. Perhaps the most problematic issue regarding consistency with WTO law would
arise if a domestic climate change policy were, for reasons of administrative convenience and
compliance-cost efficiency, applied to producers, but the BCA were applied to imported
products. Pauwelyn271 argues that this still might pass WTO muster. Since the domestic
measure would be intended to internalize the social cost of carbon in the price of a product and
thus to shift it forward to consumers, there would be a reasonably tight “nexus” between the
tax and the products concerned: “Therefore, even if technically the carbon tax or charge were
levied on producers based on emissions at the production site, rather than directly on products
at the point of sale, such tax or charge could still be regarded as ‘applied … indirectly … to …
products’.” 
The application of domestic process-related taxes to imports also raises issues. For the most
part, WTO law restricts the basis of comparison to characteristics of the product and not the
production or process method that created it. There is nonetheless some experience that border
adjustment for production process can be accommodated under GATT rules: for example, in
the 1987 GATT dispute US – Superfund, the panel determined that the United States could
impose a domestic tax for certain chemicals on imported goods produced using the same
chemicals; and the application by the United States of a domestic tax on ozone-depleting
chemicals to imports produced with such chemicals was not challenged.272
Accordingly, there is a line of reasoning and some case history that suggests WTO rules can be
read so as to accommodate BCAs, if implemented in the context of a credible domestic carbon-
mitigation program that imposed similar burdens on domestic producers (i.e., where the border
measure is clearly an extension of domestic measure), including programs that impose burdens
on producers or target production processes. However, this remains to be tested.
270 See Pauwelyn, “Carbon Leakage Measures,” 30-34, for a detailed exposition of this issue and a guide to the relevant
WTO jurisprudence. As to the question of whether a cap-and-trade system is a tax or a regulation, see Pauwelyn,
“Carbon Leakage Measures,” 35-41. The European Court of Justice has ruled that it is a regulation. Given the
general equivalence between taxes and regulations, we pass over this issue, although it is obviously important from
an implementation perspective.
271 Pauwelyn, U.S. Federal Climate Policy.
272 See Pauwelyn, “Carbon Leakage Measures,” for a detailed discussion of these issues, including the issue of adjusting
for taxes that are applied to upstream products or processes and are thus “hidden” taxes or, in GATT terminology,
“taxes occultes.”
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Implementation Issues
Implementing the BCA on an equitable, non-discriminatory fashion, consistent with the WTO’s
most-favoured-nation (MFN) and national treatment (NT) principles raises numerous thorny
challenges. 
First, workable (and broadly accepted) measures would have to be developed to measure
carbon content of products, both the import and the domestic like product. As the BCA would
be an extension of a domestic scheme, which imposes reporting requirements on domestic
producers, similar documentation would be required for the imported products to enable the
administering authority to apply the like tax to the like good. 
For relatively non-complex goods this seems do-able, although there are inevitable
complications for applying the tax to imports where the exporter could not supply the
necessary data.273 However, for complex products, generated by globally fragmented
production systems, where input components may be shipped intercontinentally or regionally,
and where inputs may be produced with different processes, the problem is far greater. The
early approaches to measuring carbon content were not promising in this regard, as they often
yielded widely different results for the same product. As noted above, data-mining techniques
are being developed by corporations to improve their own supply-chain efficiency and for
marketing reasons, to attract “green” consumers; such methods promise to dramatically reduce
compliance costs for firms and may provide credible carbon-content information for
compliance with carbon-tax purposes. Moreover, international agreements for shipping and air
transport, which are progressing, would obviate the need to take differing carbon content,
arising from mode and distance of transportation, into account in applying BCAs. Accordingly,
the outlook is not entirely bleak as regards the prospects for being able to construct
environmentally-efficient measures of carbon content, even for complex goods produced in
global value chains. That being said, the institutional basis for application of such systems on
an economy-wide basis is not in place.
Assuming these challenges can be overcome, the measure would still have to meet the MFN
and national treatment obligation and not place a greater burden on imports than on domestic
products. To be environmentally-efficient and non-trade-distorting, a carbon tax paid in the
exporting country should be adjusted for to avoid double carbon-taxation (this would parallel
the various adjustments provided for under the anti-dumping and anti-subsidy codes).
Adjusting for price-based measures, such as carbon taxes, is conceptually straightforward (e.g.,
under value-added-tax, or VAT, schemes, VAT paid domestically on exported products is
rebated to the exporter, while the importing jurisdiction levies its own VAT at its border). 
The issue becomes very murky, however, when dealing with regulatory command/control
measures and/or cap-and-trade schemes under which allowances may be obtained for free and
may be traded internationally, and where the carbon tax paid by the producer on a given
product under any allocation scheme varies continuously as the carbon price fluctuates.274 With
273 For a fuller discussion of this issue and the relevant WTO jurisprudence, see: Jennifer Hillman, “Changing Climate
for Carbon Taxes: Who’s Afraid of the WTO?” The German Marshall Fund of the United States, Climate and Energy
Paper Series, 2013.
274 Cosbey et al., “A Guide for the Concerned,” entertain the possibility of giving calibrated credit for national or
sectoral price-based regimes but not for non-price-based actions on grounds that the latter are too difficult to
administer. 
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the United States adopting a regulatory approach to addressing climate change (with an
admixture of sub-national carbon taxes and cap-and-trade schemes), the EU applying cap-and-
trade schemes (with an admixture of sub-Union carbon taxes and regulatory schemes), and
China applying regulatory approaches but moving towards a cap-and-trade scheme, there
would appear to be a daunting problem of identifying environmentally-efficient and legally-
sustainable carbon border offsets that give due credit where credit is due.275
Article XX Environmental Exception
If the implementation challenges are too difficult to allow the BCA scheme to meet the MFN
and NT obligations, the scheme still might be safeguarded under WTO law by GATT Article
XX(b) general exceptions for measures necessary to protect human, animal, or plant life and
health; or Article XX(g), which addresses conservation of exhaustible natural resources.276 As
an official body that defers to other official bodies on areas outside its expertise, given the
UNFCC’s official pronouncements on the link between carbon emissions and climate change
and the dangers of climate change, the WTO will in all likelihood accept any plausible scheme
to reduce carbon emissions as fitting under either or both of these provisions. The issues we
would argue lie elsewhere.
For an Article XX defence to succeed, a plausible connection must be established between the
stated environmental-policy goal (climate change mitigation) and the measure at issue (the
BCA), it must satisfy a “least trade-restrictive” test, and it must meet an “even-handedness
test” by imposing similar obligations on domestic interests. In addition, the measure must pass
the “smell test” in the chapeau to Article XX, which requires evidence of good faith that the
BCA is not a disguised restriction on trade. Practical guidance as to the type of circumstantial
evidence the implementing country must be able to provide for establishing the environmental
bona fides of its measures is provided by the WTO. This includes evidence regarding the
implementing country’s efforts in international forums and the flexibility it shows to others to
comply with its requirements (which in this case would include providing flexibility to
countries that might be assuming significant burdens of climate mitigation or developing
countries, which are not responsible for the problems in the first place). Cosbey et al.277
suggest also that the BCA be exclusively aimed at environmental goals and not
competitiveness concerns. 
275 We borrow this phrase from Hillman, “Changing Climate for Carbon,” who delves in detail into the issues to be
faced in identifying the appropriate level of tax to apply to imports (7-9), and into how to accommodate taxes levied
abroad (11). 
276 Since international conventions and declarations refer to natural resources as including living species, threats posed
by climate change to the extinction of species make carbon mitigation measures relevant to “exhaustible resources.”
This point has been made by the World Trade Organization, Appellate Body, “United States — Import Prohibition of
Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products,” WT/DS58/AB/RW, DSR 2001.
277 Cosbey et al., “A Guide for the Concerned,” 9.
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The Outlook for BCAs
While the technical challenges are daunting — a major reason why BCAs have seen almost no
application to date — the outlook is not entirely bleak. Pauwelyn278 gives a cautious
assessment that BCAs can be structured so as to be WTO-consistent, but warns that the devil is
in the details; Hillman279 gives an upbeat conclusion on the possibility of making a BCA work
in the U.S. context; Helm, Hepburn, and Ruta280 argue still more forcefully that not only can
BCAs be compatible with the WTO rules and that they represent an efficiency-enhancing
addition to the climate change toolkit, but they provide “perhaps the only way of making
substantial and speedy progress.” Conversely, Cosbey et al.281 characterize a BCA as “at best a
fall-back measure in the event of collective failure at the international level to define
appropriate levels of national action. At worst … a coercive, divisive and highly imperfect
policy tool with serious methodological challenges.” At the same time, they provide detailed
guidance on how to establish a BCA that is likely to pass WTO muster.
BCAs face three interconnected hurdles: overcoming resistance on technical grounds,
overcoming trading-partner resistance, and passing WTO review. A technically-sound BCA that
accurately targets the carbon externality in a non-discriminatory fashion would not likely have
adverse side-effects. In turn, this would minimize resistance from trading partners (such as the
EU experienced with its attempt to extend cap-and-trade to extra-EU flights landing in and
departing from the EU). Given that there is a way to read the relevant GATT provisions to
allow a WTO panel to uphold the regime, it is difficult to see a panel or the Appellate Body not
using those degrees of freedom to uphold the measure — if, of course, the defending country
gave the panel half a chance. A discriminatory or technically-challengeable BCA would meet
strong pushback from trading partners and would thus have to be able to pass WTO review,
probably under Article XX. This might be a most difficult criterion to meet, if indeed it is
necessary that the objectives be limited to environmental goals and not competitiveness
concerns given the political imperative for implementing countries to demonstrate that the
BCA does in fact address competitiveness concerns.
Ultimately, there is no bottom line on the viability of BCAs and there will not be one until they
are seriously tried.
278 Pauwelyn, “Carbon Leakage Measures.”
279 Hillman, “Changing Climate for Carbon.”
280 Helm, Hepburn, and Ruta. “Trade, climate change,” 27.
281 Cosbey et al., “A Guide for the Concerned.”
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
After Doha and Doha, climate change and trade are colliding without agreed rules to sort out
the problems. In the absence of a multilateral consensus on climate change, unilateral measures
are being implemented, including in systemically important economies, with varying levels of
ambition and conditions, and are taking shape in differing technical forms. Disciplines being
imposed on business differ in terms of the costs imposed, and subsidies for renewable-energy
development are being made both for industrial policy reasons and to meet sustainability
objectives. Moreover, in the face of generally weak action at the nation-state level, much of the
public-sector action on climate change has moved to sub-national/municipal levels and into the
courts. Of particular concern going forward is that the approaches adopted by the major
jurisdictions cannot easily be rendered coherent: the United States is using existing
environmental legislation; the EU, a climate-change-specific framework centred on cap-and-
trade; and China, a development framework heavy on technological development aimed at
reducing the carbon intensity of GDP. The Climate Action Plan released by the White House in
June 2013 signaled the need for flexibility in any future multilateral agreement.
At the same time, the corporate world is placing its bets — as it must — with some companies
fighting rear-guard actions to delay climate change measures (and lobbying governments to
support them) and others moving to respond to both activist Boards and consumer preferences,
and/or to take commercial advantage of the massive public investment that is required to
address climate change. Mainstream business has implemented strategic plans to increase
environmental sustainability; although the pace of improvement has been modest, the tracing
of carbon footprints in supply chains is likely to reshape market access based on the purchasing
decisions of major multinationals. 
The situation on the ground in terms of climate change impacts is developing along the lines of
worst-case scenarios, with minimal progress in arresting global warming, and a more rapid
onset of consequences than had been imagined. Planning scenarios are now seriously
considering double the amount of warming deemed to be “safe.” Such an extent of warming
risks triggering natural positive feedbacks that would substantially compound the warming
induced by human action. 
In this regard, we observe that there is a clear disconnect between the scale of costs attributed
to climate change in the core economic literature (a few percentage points of global GDP at
most, with some positive estimates in the mix) and what appears likely in view of the scale of
costs already being realized at less than 1°C of warming — not to mention the risk of much
greater costs that the scientific community perceives in subjective evaluations. For example,
Nordhaus’ estimate of the cost of delaying acting on climate change is US$4 trillion, which is a
fraction of the value of daily trading in financial markets or, put alternatively, a loss equivalent
to a bad day on global stock markets. It is hardly catastrophic, even if the loss were permanent.
The disconnect appears to reflect three things: the choice of relatively low stabilization points
for global temperatures; the discounting of tail risks; and inadequate consideration of the
degree to which existing patterns of urban formation are rendered sub-optimal and the
implications for the value of sunk assets. In the latter regard, while flora, fauna, and marine life
are shifting pole-ward and towards higher altitudes, cities remain fixed in place and must adapt
legacy infrastructure developed for a bygone climatic era. The practical consequences include
building up flood defences, revising building codes and zoning regulations, and even changing
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the species of shade trees planted in urban forest programs — with adaptation costs measured
in current dollars, not heavily discounted future dollars. On top of this, the cumulative costs of
weather-related disasters that the insurance industry links to climate change is growing rapidly.
Simply put, the reality seems more serious than serious economics has determined.
Popular perceptions are being shaped by very costly extreme weather events that are, in a
probabilistic sense, being persuasively linked to global warming. Moreover, public perception
is out in front of governments on climate change. If the results from the recent Pew global
survey are taken at face value, climate change ranks first in the list of concerns; that cannot
credibly be said to be the same among the governments of the major economies. Political
postures in the democratic zones will likely follow, however, even if with a lag. The conclusion
to be drawn from this is that the pressures are building.
Under the current post Doha/Doha circumstances, the trading system is having a decidedly
negative impact on climate-change-mitigation efforts. Competitiveness concerns are
increasingly significant in a global economy that has reached an advanced stage of integration,
with products increasingly “made in the world” and trade competition reaching ever deeper
into production processes (“the great unbundling”). This concern, together with pushback from
trading partners, is clearly constraining unilateral action. 
Consider the EU and Australia, which were the leaders at the Doha COP. The EU has delayed
implementing carbon charges on international flights landing in the EU under pressure from
trading partners, and Australia is about to abandon its carbon tax — the measure that
economists almost universally deem most appropriate — following a political campaign based
on competitiveness concerns.
Moreover, the WTO decision in the Canada – FIT case, which ruled out local content
requirements, will constrain local-tax-funded unilateral action on climate change since the
industrial benefits cannot be captured locally but must be shared globally, including with firms
in jurisdictions that may be free-riding on climate mitigation. Arguably, this goes in the wrong
direction.
Consider, for example, the solar-panel field, where climate-change-mitigation efforts in the
absence of multilaterally-agreed burden sharing have fuelled industrial wars over new energy
technology with the usual results of a battlefield littered with fallen bankrupts, distorted
markets and inefficient use of public funds, and recourse to trade measures (including tit-for-tat
retaliation) consistent with the predictions of strategic trade theory. 
As a thought experiment, suppose that the Appellate Body’s reasoning in Canada – FIT
regarding the creation of new industries had been reflected in a WTO carve-out for local
content restrictions in situations where
– governments support the establishment of a new industry that would otherwise not take
root, in a context where 
– there are significant positive externalities associated with the new industry and significant
negative externalities associated with the industry that it would eventually supplant, and
where
– there is no multilateral agreement in place to support the establishment of the new industry
and to appropriately allocate burdens to ensure that all have a fair opportunity to share in
the industrial benefits through trade. 
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Such a carve-out would have allowed the EU and U.S. solar-panel industries to develop on the
basis of EU and U.S. domestic-consumption subsidies, without risk of leakage to third
jurisdictions. Logically, as the risk of leakage rises, so does the propensity to shift the subsidy
from consumption to production, since a consumption subsidy can be exploited by third
countries, whereas a producer subsidy cannot. Accordingly, the local content requirement (a
bad thing in and of itself in a first-best world) would encourage a good thing (avoiding
producer subsidies, which generally turn out badly). 
The pluralization of the local content requirements through WTO-sanctioned preferential
agreements would then have allowed trade within the burden-sharing group to enable the usual
gains from trade, while excluding non-burden-sharing parties. In such circumstances, if China
were to be considered a non-burden-sharing party, its ambitions on solar panels would have
been channeled in the first instance into supporting adoption of solar panels in its own
domestic market and secondarily would have led it to seek entry into an agreement with the
other major burden-sharing jurisdictions in order to gain access to their markets in a manner
analogous to the way the trade restrictions in the Montreal Protocol worked to promote
membership in that agreement. The novel element here is that, in place of an MEA, we
hypothesize an approved derogation from an existing WTO restriction on local content
requirements. We offer as a conjecture that this might have largely spared the global
community the negative aspects of the rivalry for domination of the solar-panel field.
Going in the other direction, the inevitable spillover of climate-change-motivated actions into
dispute settlement, the long-feared result of trade conflict related to climate change, has in fact
emerged. Observers of the WTO have long been concerned about the ability of the dispute
settlement system to survive a truly big dispute between the major economies. Trade and
climate change could put that theory to the test, with the single largest anti-dumping case (in
terms of face value of trade affected) in the history of the GATT/WTO now underway (the
EU’s investigation into solar panels from China), and still not fully resolved. 
Both the trading system and the environment provide a public good with very large positive
externalities — which is to say that there is a global commons in both spheres. There has been
very little success in managing any global commons outside the framework of effective
multilateral instruments. Thus, notwithstanding the “buzz” of the multiple parallel initiatives
described above, the failure of Doha and Doha expose both of these two critical commons to
risk. Nature is sending warning shots over the bow in the form of an increased frequency of
extreme weather events. The trading system is sending warning shots over the bow in the form
of a mounting caseload of trade-remedy actions and trade disputes in climate-related areas.
Since the trade conflict is a spillover from the unsettled conflict over who is to foot the bill for
the unfunded liability that is climate change, the scale of the former is geared to the scale of
the latter and thus may become very large indeed. 
To summarize, three negative dynamics have emerged endogenously: trade linkages are
inhibiting effective unilateral action due to industrial competitiveness concerns; activist
governments are coming into conflict with trade rules, as they seek to prevent leakage of
industrial benefits through trade; and industrial policy competition (including through strategic
trade policy) has been induced, with the consequences spilling over into the trade-dispute
system. The central thesis of this paper is that failure to reach a co-operative burden-sharing
agreement creates a classic “second-best” problem in that a “first-best” outcome on trade,
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given the current trade rules, may have decidedly negative effects in terms of inhibiting action
of climate change, because it forbids discrimination against free riders on climate change
mitigation. At the same time, this feeds back onto the trading system in terms of generating
trade conflicts. The solution, we argue, is to bend the trade rules. 
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http://policyschool.ucalgary.ca/?q=content/income-inequality-redistribution-and-economic-growth
Bev Dahlby and Ergete Ferede | August 2013
DIPLOMACY, GLOBALIZATION AND HETEROPOLARITY: THE CHALLENGE OF ADAPTATION
http://policyschool.ucalgary.ca/?q=content/diplomacy-globalization-and-heteropolarity-challenge-adaptation
Daryl Copeland | August 2013
UNHEALTHY PRESSURE: HOW PHYSICIAN PAY DEMANDS PUT THE SQUEEZE ON PROVINCIAL HEALTH-CARE
BUDGETS
http://policyschool.ucalgary.ca/?q=content/unhealthy-pressure-how-physician-pay-demands-put-squeeze-
provincial-health-care-budgets
Hugh M. Grant and Jeremiah Hurley | July 2013
TRENDS, PEAKS, AND TROUGHS: NATIONAL AND REGIONAL EMPLOYMENT CYCLES IN CANADA
http://policyschool.ucalgary.ca/?q=content/trends-peaks-and-troughs-national-and-regional-employment-
cycles-canada
Ronald Kneebone and Margarita Gres | July 2013
